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Abstract—Non-malleable codes, introduced by Dziembowski,
Pietrzak and Wichs (ICS 2010), encode messages s in a manner so
that tampering the codeword causes the decoder to either output
s or a message that is independent of s. While this is an impossible
goal to achieve against unrestricted tampering functions, rather
surprisingly non-malleable coding becomes possible against every
fixed family F of tampering functions that is not too large (for
instance, when |F| 6 22αn for some α < 1 where n is the number
of bits in a codeword).
In this work, we study the “capacity of non-malleable codes,”
and establish optimal bounds on the achievable rate as a function
of the family size, answering an open problem from Dziembowski
et al. (ICS 2010). Specifically,
• We prove that for every family F with |F| 6 22αn , there
exist non-malleable codes against F with rate arbitrarily
close to 1 − α (this is achieved w.h.p. by a randomized
construction).
• We show the existence of families of size exp(nO(1)2αn)
against which there is no non-malleable code of rate 1− α
(in fact this is the case w.h.p for a random family of this
size).
• We also show that 1− α is the best achievable rate for the
family of functions which are only allowed to tamper the
first αn bits of the codeword, which is of special interest.
As a corollary, this implies that the capacity of non-
malleable coding in the split-state model (where the tamper-
ing function acts independently but arbitrarily on the two
halves of the codeword, a model which has received some
attention recently) equals 1/2.
We also give an efficient Monte Carlo construction of codes
of rate close to 1 with polynomial time encoding and decoding
that is non-malleable against any fixed c > 0 and family F of
size 2n
c
, in particular tampering functions with, say, cubic size
circuits.
I. INTRODUCTION
NON-MALLEABLE codes are a fascinating new conceptput forth in [1], following the program on non-malleable
cryptography which was introduced by the seminal work of
Dolev, Dwork and Naor [2]. Non-malleable codes are aimed at
protecting the integrity of data in situations where it might be
Mahdi Cheraghchi is with the Department of Computing, Imperial College
London, UK (email: m.cheraghchi@imperial.ac.uk). Venkatesan Guruswami
is with the Computer Science Department, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
(email: guruswami@cmu.edu). M. Cheraghchi’s research was supported in
part by V. Guruswami’s Packard Fellowship, MSR-CMU Center for Com-
putational Thinking, and the Swiss National Science Foundation research
grant PA00P2-141980. Work done for the most part while the author was
with the Computer Science Department of Carnegie Mellon University and
MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. V. Guruswami’s
research was supported in part by a Packard Fellowship and by the National
Science Foundation under Grant No. CCF-0963975. Any opinions, findings,
and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of
the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science
Foundation. A preliminary version of this article appears under the same title
in proceedings of Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS 2014).
corrupted in ways that precludes error-correction or even error-
detection. Informally, a code is non-malleable if the corrupted
codeword either encodes the original message, or a completely
unrelated value. This is akin to the notion of non-malleable
encryption in cryptography which requires the intractability
of, given a ciphertext, producing a different ciphertext so that
the corresponding plaintexts are related to each other.
A non-malleable code against a family F of tamper-
ing functions each mapping {0, 1}n to {0, 1}n, consists of
a randomized encoding function Enc : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n
and a deterministic decoding function Dec : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}k∪{⊥} (where ⊥ denotes error-detection) which satisfy
Dec(Enc(s)) = s always, and the following non-malleability
property with error : For every message s ∈ {0, 1}k and
every function f ∈ F , the distribution of Dec(f(Enc(s)) is
-close to a distribution Df that depends only on f and is
independent1 of s. In other words, if some adversary (who
has full knowledge of the code and the message s, but not
the internal randomness of the encoder) tampers with the
codeword Enc(s) corrupting it to f(Enc(s)), he cannot control
the relationship between s and the message the corrupted
codeword f(Enc(s)) encodes.
In general, it is impossible to achieve non-malleability
against arbitrary tampering functions. Indeed, the tampering
function can decode the codeword to compute the original
message s, flip the last bit of s to obtain a related message
s˜, and then re-encode s˜. This clearly violates non-malleability
as the tampered codeword encodes the message s˜ which is
closely related to s. Therefore, in order to construct non-
malleable codes, one focuses on a restricted class of tampering
functions. For example, the body of work on error-correcting
codes consists of functions which can flip an arbitrary subset
of bits up to a prescribed limit on the total number of bit flips.
The notion of non-malleable coding becomes more interest-
ing for families against which error-correction is not possible.
A simple and natural such family is the set of functions causing
arbitrary “additive errors,” namely Fadd = {f∆ | ∆ ∈ {0, 1}n}
where f∆(x) := x + ∆. Note that there is no restriction
on the Hamming weight of ∆ as in the case of channels
causing bounded number of bit flips. While error-correction
is impossible against Fadd, error-detection is still possible
— the work of Cramer et al. [3] constructed codes of rate
approaching 1 (which they called “Algebraic Manipulation
Detection” (AMD) codes) such that offset by an arbitrary
∆ 6= 0 will be detected with high probability. AMD codes
give a construction of non-malleable codes against the family
1The formal definition (see Definition4) has to accommodate the possibility
that Dec error-corrects the tampered codeword to the original message s; and
this is handled in a manner independent of s by including a special element
same in the support of Df .
2Fadd.
Even error-detection becomes impossible against many
other natural families of tampering functions. A particularly
simple such class consists of all constant functions fc(x) := c
for c ∈ {0, 1}n. This family includes some function that
maps all inputs to a valid codeword c∗, and hence one
cannot detect tampering. Note, however, that non-malleability
is trivial to achieve against this family — the rate 1 code with
identity encoding function is itself non-malleable as the output
distribution of a constant function is trivially independent
of the message. A natural function family for which non-
malleability is non-trivial to achieve consists of bit-tampering
functions f in which the different bits of the codewords are
tampered independently (i.e., either flipped, set to 0/1, or left
unchanged); formally f(x) = (f1(x1), f2(x2), . . . , fn(xn))
for arbitrary 1-bit functions f1, f2, . . . , fn [1].
The family Fall of all functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n has
size given by log log |Fall| = n + log n. The authors of [1]
show the existence of a non-malleable code against any small
enough family F (for which log log |F| < n). The rate of the
code is constant if log log |F| 6 αn for some constant α ∈
(0, 1). The question of figuring out the optimal rates of non-
malleable codes for various families of tampering functions
was left as an open problem in [1]. In this work we give a
satisfactory answer to this question, pinning down the rate for
many natural function families. We describe our results next.
A. Our results
Our results include improvements to the rate achievable as
a function of the size of the family of tampering functions,
as well as limitations of non-malleable codes demonstrating
that the achieved rate cannot be improved for natural families
of the stipulated size. Specifically, we establish the following
results concerning the possible rates for non-malleable coding
as a function of the size of the family of tampering functions:
1) (Rate lower bound) We prove in Section III that if
|F| 6 22αn , then there exists a (strong) non-malleable
code of rate arbitrarily close to 1 − α which is non-
malleable w.r.t F with error exp(−Ω(n)). This signif-
icantly improves the probabilistic construction of [1],
which achieves a rate close to (1−α)/3 using a delicate
Martingale argument. In particular, for arbitrary small
families, of size 22
o(n)
, our result shows that the rate can
be made arbitrarily close to 1. This was not known to be
possible even for the family of bit-tampering functions
(which has size 4n), for which 1/3 was the best known
rate2 [1]. In fact, we note (in Section V-D) why the proof
strategy of [1] is limited to a rate of 1/2 even for a very
simple tampering function such as the one that flips the
first bit. As discussed in Section III-C, our probabilistic
construction is equipped with an encoder and decoder
that can be efficiently and exactly implemented with
2Assuming the existence of one-way functions, an explicit construction of
non-malleable codes of rate close to 1 was proposed in [1]. This construction,
however, only satisfies a weaker definition of non-malleability that considers
computational indistinguishability rather than statistical security.
access to a uniformly random permutation oracle and
its inverse (corresponding to the ideal-cipher model in
cryptography). This is a slight additional advantage over
[1], where only an approximation of the encoder and
decoder is shown to be efficiently computable.
2) (Upper bound/limitations on rate) The above coding the-
orem shows that the “capacity” of a function family |F|
for non-malleable coding is at least 1− (log log |F|)/n.
We also address the natural “converse coding question”
of whether this rate bound is the best achievable (Sec-
tion V). This turns out to be false in general due to the
existence of uninteresting large families for which non-
malleable coding with rate close to 1 is easy. But we do
prove that the 1−α rate is best achievable in “virtually
all” situations:
a) We prove that for random families of size 22
αn
,
with high probability it is not possible to exceed a
rate of 1− α for non-malleable coding with small
error.
b) For the family of tampering functions which leave
the last (1 − α)n bits intact and act arbitrarily on
the first αn bits, we prove that 1 − α is the best
achievable rate for non-malleable coding. (Note
that a rate of 1 − α is trivial to achieve for this
family, by placing the message bits in the last
(1−α)n bits of the codeword, and setting the first
αn bits of the codeword to all 0s.)
The result 2b, together with the existential result 1 above,
pins down the optimal rate for non-malleable codes in the split-
state model to 1/2. In the split-state model, which was the fo-
cus of a couple of recent works [4], [5], the tampering function
operates independently (but in otherwise arbitrary ways) on the
two halves of the codeword, i.e., f(x) = ((f1(x1), f2(x2))
where x1, x2 are the two halves of x and f1, f2 are functions
mapping n/2 bits to n/2 bits. The recent work [5] gave an
explicit construction in this model with polynomially small
rate. Our work shows that the capacity of the split-state model
is 1/2, but we do not offer any explicit construction. For the
more restrictive class of bit-tampering functions (where each
bit is tampered independently), in a follow-up work [6] we
give an explicit construction with rate approaching 1 [6]. We
also present in that work a reduction of non-malleable coding
for the split-state model to a new notion of non-malleable
two-source extraction.
Monte Carlo construction for small families. Our result 1
above is based on a random construction which takes expo-
nential time (and space). Derandomizing this construction, in
Section IV we are able to obtain an efficient Monte Carlo
construction of non-malleable codes of rate close to 1 (with
polynomial time encoding and decoding, and inverse polyno-
mially small error) for an arbitrary family of size exp(nc)
for any fixed c > 0. Note that in particular this includes
tampering functions that can be implemented by circuits of
any fixed polynomial size, or simpler families such as bit-
tampering adversaries. The construction does not rely on any
computational hardness assumptions, at the cost of using a
small amount of randomness.
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Rate lower bound. Our construction of rate ≈ 1 −
(log log |F|)/n codes is obtained by picking for each message,
a random blob of t codewords, such that blobs corresponding
to distinct messages are disjoint. For each tampering function
f , our proof analyzes the distribution of Dec(f(Enc(s)) for
each message s separately, and shows that w.h.p. they are
essentially close to the same distribution Df . In order to
achieve sufficiently small error probability allowing for a union
bound, the proof uses a number of additional ideas, including a
randomized process that gradually reveals information about
the code while examining the t codewords in each blob in
sequence. The analysis ensures that as little information is
revealed in each step as possible, so that enough independence
remains in the conditional joint distribution of the codewords
throughout the analysis. Finally, strong concentration bounds
are used to derive the desired bound on the failure probability.
The proof for the special case of bijective tampering functions
turns out to be quite straightforward, and as a warm-up we
present this special case first in Section III-A.
Monte Carlo construction. Since the analysis of the proba-
bilistic code construction considers each message s separately,
we observe that it only needs limited (t-wise) independence
of the codewords. On the other hand, the code construction is
designed to be sparse, namely taking t = poly(n, log |F|, 1/)
suffices for the analysis. This is the key idea behind our
efficient Monte Carlo construction for small families with
log |F| 6 poly(n).
The birthday paradox implies that picking the blob of
codewords encoding each message independently of other
messages, while maintaining disjointness of the various blobs,
limits the rate to 1/2. Therefore, we construct the code by
means of a t-wise independent decoding function implemented
via a random low-degree polynomial. After overcoming some
complications to ensure an efficient encoding function, we
get our efficient randomized construction for small families
of tampering functions.
Rate upper bounds. Our main impossibility result for the
family of adversaries that only tamper the first αn bits of the
codeword uses an information theoretic argument. We argue
that if the rate of the code is sufficiently large, one can always
find messages s0 and s1 and a set Xη ⊆ {0, 1}αn such that the
following holds: The first αn bits of the encoding of s0 has
a noticeable chance of being in Xη , whereas this chance for
s1 is quite small. Using this property, we design an adversary
that maps the first αn bits of the encoding to a dummy string
if they belong to Xη and leaves the codeword intact otherwise.
This suffices to violate non-malleability of the code.
C. Subsequent work
After the original write-up of this work, numerous exciting
developments have emerged, of which we recall a few. Faust
et al. [7] describe a probabilistic construction of non-malleable
codes that, for a tampering family of size bounded by 22
αn
,
attains a sub-optimal rate of 1−O(α) (with high probability
and with a negligible error). However, this construction is the
most interesting when the family of tampering functions is
bounded in size by 2poly(n), in which case it attains a rate
close to 1 and a polynomial dependence of the running time
of the encoder and decoder functions on the security parameter
log(1/). In a different work, Faust et al. [8] define the
generalized notion of continuous non-malleable codes which,
intuitively, allow the adversary to tamper the same codeword
multiple times (without the need to re-encode the message
using fresh randomness for each tampering). Jafargholi and
Wichs [9] obtain an improved analysis of the idea in [7] to
show existence of non-malleable codes achieving the optimal
rate of about 1 − α and secure with respect to continuous
tampering. Similar to [7], this result also enjoys a polynomial
dependence of the encoder and decoder running times on the
security parameter. This construction additionally comes with
the ability of tamper detection for well behaved tampering
functions, as shown to hold for our construction in Remark 11
(i.e., for tampering functions f with few fixed points such that
f(Un), where Un is the uniform distribution on {0, 1}n, has
sufficiently large min-entropy).
Further applications of non-malleable codes in non-
malleable cryptography have been shown by Coretti et al. [10]
(in the context of non-malleable public-key encryption) and
by Agrawal et al. [11] (in the context of non-malleable string
commitment schemes). Roughly speaking, these constructions
use suitable non-malleable codes to extend, in a modular way,
a non-malleable cryptographic protocol acting on single bits
(such as a bit-commitment scheme) to one that can act on
arbitrarily long strings while preserving non-malleability.
Organization. The rest of the article is organized as follows.
Section II reviews preliminaries and notation including defini-
tions of non-malleability used throughout the article. Prob-
abilistic construction of general rate-optimal non-malleable
codes is presented in Section III. Section IV provides a
randomness efficient variation of this result, thereby obtaining
Monte-Carlo constructions of non-malleable codes against any
family F of adversaries such that log |F| 6 poly(n). Finally,
Section V proves impossibility results complementing the
achievability results of Sections III and IV.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
We use Un for the uniform distribution on {0, 1}n and Un
for the random variable sampled from Un and independently of
any existing randomness. For a random variable X , we denote
by D(X) the probability distribution that X is sampled from.
Moreover, for an event E , we use D(X | E) to denote the
conditional distribution of the random variable X on the event
E . Generally, we will use calligraphic symbols (such as X ) for
probability distributions and the corresponding capital letters
(such as X) for related random variables. For a discrete distri-
bution X , we denote by X (x) the probability mass assigned to
x by X . Two distributions X and Y being -close in statistical
distance is denoted by X ≈ Y . We will use (X ,Y) for the
product distribution with the two coordinates independently
4sampled from X and Y . All unsubscripted logarithms are
taken to the base 2. Support of a discrete random variable (or
distribution) X is denoted by supp(X). With a slight abuse
of notation, for various bounds we condition probabilities
and expectations on random variables rather than events (e.g.,
E[X|Y ], or Pr[E|Y ]). In such instances, the notation means
that the statement holds for every possible realization of the
random variables that we condition on.
The empirical distribution of t objects a1, . . . , at from a
universe Ω is the probability distribution over Ω that sets, for
each i ∈ Ω, the probability mass on i to be |{j ∈ [t] : aj =
i}|/t.
B. Definitions
In this section, we review the formal definition of non-
malleable codes as introduced in [1]. First, we recall the notion
of coding schemes.
Definition 1 (Coding schemes). A pair of functions
Enc : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n and Dec : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k ∪ {⊥}
where k 6 n is said to be a coding scheme with block length
n and message length k if the following conditions hold.
1) The encoder Enc is a randomized function; i.e., at each
call it receives a uniformly random sequence of coin
flips that the output may depend on. This random input
is usually omitted from the notation and taken to be
implicit. Thus for any s ∈ {0, 1}k, Enc(s) is a random
variable over {0, 1}n. The decoder Dec is, however,
deterministic.
2) For every s ∈ {0, 1}k, we have Dec(Enc(s)) = s with
probability 1.
The rate of the coding scheme is the ratio k/n. A coding
scheme is said to have relative distance δ, for some δ ∈ [0, 1),
if for every s ∈ {0, 1}k the following holds. Let X := Enc(s).
Then, for any ∆ ∈ {0, 1}n of Hamming weight at most δn,
Dec(X + ∆) =⊥ with probability 1.
Remark 2. In this paper, we have followed the common
coding-theoretic convention used in the original work of
Dziembowski et al. [1]. Namely, a coding scheme is defined
with respect to fixed choices of k and n. When there is no
risk of ambiguity, this notion is implicitly extended to mean
an infinite ensemble of coding schemes for various choices of
block length n tending infinity (and message lengths at least
Rn for a prescribed rate parameter R).
Before defining non-malleable coding schemes, we find it
convenient to define the following notation.
Definition 3. For a finite set Γ, the function copy : (Γ ∪
{same})× Γ→ Γ is defined as follows:
copy(x, y) :=
{
x x 6= same,
y x = same.
Naturally, the notation can be extended to random variables so
that for random variables X and Y respectively supported on
Γ∪{same} and Γ, the random variable copy(X,Y ), supported
on Γ, is defined according to the above rule.
The notion of non-malleable coding schemes from [1] can now
be rephrased as follows.
Definition 4 (Non-malleability). A coding scheme (Enc,Dec)
with message length k and block length n is said to be non-
malleable with error  (also called exact security) with respect
to a family F of tampering functions acting on {0, 1}n (i.e.,
each f ∈ F maps {0, 1}n to {0, 1}n) if for every f ∈ F
there is a distribution Df over {0, 1}k ∪ {⊥, same} such that
the following holds for all s ∈ {0, 1}k. Define the random
variable S := Dec(f(Enc(s))), and let S′ be independently
sampled from Df . Then, D(S) ≈ D(copy(S′, s)).
Remark 5. The above definition allows the decoder to output
a special symbol ⊥ that corresponds to error detection. It
is easy to note that any such code can be transformed to
one where the decoder never outputs ⊥ without affecting
the parameters (e.g., the new decoder may simply output 0k
whenever the original decoder outputs ⊥).
Dziembowski et al. [1] also consider the following stronger
variation of non-malleable codes.
Definition 6 (Strong non-malleability). A pair of functions as
in Definition 4 is said to be a strong non-malleable coding
scheme with error  with respect to a family F of tampering
functions acting on {0, 1}n if the following holds. For any
message s ∈ {0, 1}k, let Es := Enc(s), consider the random
variable
Df,s :=
{
same if f(Es) = Es,
Dec(f(Es)) otherwise,
and let Df,s := D(Df,s). It must be the case that for every pair
of distinct messages s1, s2 ∈ {0, 1}k, Df,s1 ≈ Df,s2 .
Remark 7 (Computational security). Dziembowski et al.
also consider the case where statistical distance is replaced
with computational indistinguishability with respect to a
bounded computational model. As our goal is to understand
information-theoretic limitations of non-malleable codes, we
do not consider this variation in this work. It is clear, however,
that our negative results in Section V apply to this model as
well. A related (but incomparable) model that we consider in
Section IV is when the distinguishability criterion is still statis-
tical; however the adversary is computationally bounded (e.g.,
one may consider the family of polynomial sized Boolean
circuits). For this case, we construct an efficient Monte Carlo
coding scheme that achieves any rate arbitrarily close to 1.
Remark 8 (Efficiency of sampling Df ). The original defini-
tion of non-malleable codes in [1] also requires the distribution
Df to be efficiently samplable given oracle access to the
tampering function f . We find it more natural to remove this
requirement from the definition since even combinatorial non-
malleable codes that are not necessarily equipped with efficient
components (such as the encoder, decoder, and sampler for
Df ) are interesting and highly non-trivial to construct. It
should be noted; however, that for any non-malleable coding
scheme equipped with an efficient encoder and decoder, it can
be shown that the following is a valid and efficiently samplable
5choice for the distribution Df (possibly incurring a constant
factor increase in the error parameter):
1) Let S ∼ Uk, and X := f(Enc(S)).
2) If Dec(X) = S, output same. Otherwise, output
Dec(X).
Our Monte Carlo construction in Section IV is equipped with
a polynomial-time encoder and decoder. So is the case for our
probabilistic construction in Section III in the random oracle
model.
III. PROBABILISTIC CONSTRUCTION OF NON-MALLEABLE
CODES
In this section, we introduce our probabilistic construction
of non-malleable codes. Contrary to the original construction
of Dziembowski et al. [1], where they pick a uniformly
random truth table for the decoder and do not allow the ⊥
symbol, our code is quite sparse. In fact, in our construction
Dec(Un) =⊥ with high probability (which, as an added
benefit, allows for almost sure tamper detection for certain well
behaved tampering functions, see Remark 11). As we observe
in Section V-D, this is the key to our improvement, since
uniformly random decoders cannot achieve non-malleability
even against extremely simple adversaries at rates better than
1/2. Moreover, our sparse construction offers the added feature
of having a large minimum distance in the standard coding
sense; any tampering scheme that perturbs the codeword in a
fraction of the positions bounded by a prescribed limit will be
detected by the decoder with probability 1. Another advantage
of sparsity is allowing a compact representation for the code.
We exploit this feature in our Monte Carlo construction of
Section IV. Our probabilistic coding scheme is described in
Construction 1. We note that there is an extra parameter
δ ∈ [0, 1/2) in this construction, which enforces the relative
Hamming distance between every two possible codewords in
the construction to be larger than δ. This added feature may
be of interest for certain applications that require some degree
of noise resilience in addition to non-malleability. Of course
one can set δ = 0 if the only goal is to achieve (strong) non-
malleability.
We remark that Construction 1 can be efficiently imple-
mented in the ideal-cipher model, which in turn implies an
efficient approximate implementation in the random oracle
model (see the discussion following the proof of Theorem 9
in Section III-C). In turn, this implies that the distribution Df
in Definition 4 for this construction can be efficiently sampled
in both models (see Remark 8).
The main theorem of this section is the result below that
proves non-malleability of the coding scheme in Construc-
tion 1.
Theorem 9. Let F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be any family of
tampering functions. For any , η > 0, with probability at least
1 − η, the coding scheme (Enc,Dec) of Construction 1 is a
strong non-malleable code with respect to F and with error
 and relative distance δ, provided that both of the following
conditions are satisfied.
• Given: Integer parameters 0 < k 6 n and integer t > 0
such that t2k < 2n, and a relative distance parameter δ,
0 6 δ < 1/2.
• Output: A pair of functions Enc : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n
and Dec : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k, where Enc may also use
a uniformly random seed (which is hidden from the
notation), but Dec is deterministic.
• Construction:
1) Let N := {0, 1}n.
2) For each s ∈ {0, 1}k, in an arbitrary order,
– Let E(s) := ∅.
– For i ∈ {1, . . . , t}:
a) Pick a uniformly random vector w ∈ N .
b) Add w to E(s).
c) Let Γ(w) be the Hamming ball of radius δn
centered at w. Remove Γ(w) from N (note
that when δ = 0, we have Γ(w) = {w}).
3) Given s ∈ {0, 1}k, Enc(s) outputs an element of
E(s) uniformly at random.
4) Given w ∈ {0, 1}n, Dec(s) outputs the unique s
such that w ∈ E(s), or ⊥ if no such s exists.
Construction 1: Probabilistic construction of non-malleable
codes.
1) t > t0, for some
t0 = O
(
1
6
(
n+ log
|F|
η
))
. (1)
2) k 6 k0, for some
k0 > n(1− h(δ))− log t− 3 log(1/)−O(1), (2)
where h(·) denotes the binary entropy function.
Thus by choosing t = t0 and k = k0, the construction satisfies
k > n(1−h(δ))− log log(|F|/η)− log n−9 log(1/)−O(1).
In particular, if |F| 6 22αn for any constant α ∈ (0, 1), the
rate of the code can be made arbitrarily close to 1−h(δ)−α
while allowing  = 2−Ω(n).
Remark 10. (Error detection) An added feature of our sparse
coding scheme is the error-detection capability. However,
observe that any probabilistic coding scheme that is non-
malleable against all families of adversaries of bounded size
over {0, 1}n (such as Construction 1, Construction 2, and the
probabilistic construction of [1]) can be turned into one having
relative distance δ (and satisfying the same non-malleability
guarantees) by composing the construction with a fixed code
C of block length n and relative distance δ. That is, the
new scheme would first encode the message using the non-
malleable code and would then further encode the resulting
vector using C. Indeed, any class F of tampering functions
for the composed code corresponds to a class F ′ of the same
size or less for the original construction. Namely, each function
f ′ ∈ F ′ equals DecC ◦ f (DecC being the decoder3 of C) for
3If achieving strong non-malleability (Definition 6) is desired, extra care
is necessary to ensure that the decoder function DecC never corrects errors
(since Definition 6 implicitly discourages error correction).
6some f ∈ F . We allow the possibility of δ > 0 directly in our
construction since doing so does not make the analysis any
more complicated.
A. Proof of Theorem 9 for bijective adversaries
We first prove the theorem for adversaries that are bijective
and have no fixed points. This case is still broad enough to
contain interesting families of adversaries such as additive
error adversaries Fadd mentioned in the introduction, for
which case we reconstruct the existence proof of AMD codes
(although optimal explicit constructions of AMD codes are
already known [3], [12]).
As it turns out, the analysis for this case is quite straight-
forward, and significantly simpler than the general case that
we will address in Section III-B.
Let N := 2n, K := 2k, and consider a fixed message s ∈
{0, 1}k and a fixed bijective tampering function f : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n such that for all x ∈ {0, 1}n, f(x) 6= x. We show that
the non-malleability requirement of Definition 4 holds with
respect to the distribution Df that is entirely supported on
{⊥}. That is, we wish to show that with high probability, the
coding scheme (Enc,Dec) of Construction 1 is so that
Pr[Dec(f(Enc(s))) 6=⊥] 6 . (3)
By taking a union bound over all choices of f and s, this would
imply that with high probability, the code is non-malleable (in
fact, strongly non-malleable) for the entire family F .
Let E(s) := supp(Enc(s)) be the set of the t codewords
that are mapped to s by the decoder. Let E1, . . . , Et be
the codewords in this set in the order they are picked by
the code construction. For any fixed x ∈ {0, 1}n, we know
that Pr[Dec(x) 6=⊥] 6 t(K − 1)/(N − t) 6 γ1−γ , where
γ := tK/N . This can be seen by observing that the code
construction chooses the codewords uniformly at random and
without replacement, combined with a union bound. Thus, in
particular, Pr[Dec(f(E1)) 6=⊥] 6 γ1−γ (since f(E1) 6= E1,
the knowledge of E1 ∈ E(s) only decreases this probability).
In fact, the same argument holds for Dec(f(E2)) condi-
tioned on any realization of f(E1), and more generally, since
f(E1), . . . , f(Et) are distinct, one can derive for each i ∈ [t],
Pr[Dec(f(Ei)) 6=⊥| f(E1), . . . , f(Ei−1)] 6 γ
1− γ . (4)
Define indicator random variables 0 = X0, X1, . . . , Xt ∈
{0, 1}, where Xi = 1 iff Dec(f(Ei)) 6=⊥. From (4) and using
Proposition 31, we can deduce that for all i ∈ [t], Pr[Xi =
1 | X0, . . . , Xi−1] 6 γ1−γ . Now, using Proposition 35, letting
X := X1 +· · ·+Xt, it follows that Pr[X > t] 6
(
eγ
(1−γ)
)t
.
Assuming γ 6 /4, the above upper bound simplifies to
exp(−Ω(t)). By taking a union bound over all possible
choices of s and f (that we trivially upper bound by N |F|),
it can be seen that, as long as t > t0 for some choice of
t0 = O
(
1
 log(
N |F|
η )
)
, the probability that (Enc,Dec) fails to
satisfy (3) for some choice of s and f is at most η.
Finally, observe that the assumption γ 6 /4 can be satisfied
provided that K 6 K0 for some choice of K0 = Ω(N/t),
or equivalently, when k 6 k0 for some choice of k > n −
log t − log(1/). Note that for this case the proof obtains a
better dependence on  compared to (1) and (2).
B. Proof of Theorem 9 for general adversaries
First, we present a proof sketch describing the ideas an
intuitions behind the general proof, and then proceed with a
full proof of the theorem.
1) Proof sketch: In the proof for bijective adversaries, we
heavily used the fact that the tampering of each set E(s)
of codewords is a disjoint set of the same size. For general
adversaries; however, this may not be true. Intuitively, since
the codewords in E(s) are chosen uniformly and almost
independently at random (ignoring the distinctness dependen-
cies), the tampered distribution f(E(s)) should look similar
to f(Un) for all s, if |E(s)| is sufficiently large. Indeed, this
is what is shown in the proof. The proof also adjusts the
probability mass of same according to the fraction of the fixed
points of f , but we ignore this technicality for the proof sketch.
Note that the distribution f(Un) may be arbitrary, and may
assign a large probability mass to a small set of the probability
space. For example, f may assign half of the probability mass
to a single point. We call the points in {0, 1}n receiving a
noticeable share of the probability mass in f(Un) the heavy
elements of {0, 1}n, and fix the randomness of the code
construction so that the decoder’s values at heavy elements are
revealed before analyzing each individual message s. Doing
so allows us to analyze each message s separately and take
a union bound on various choices of s as in the case of
bijective adversaries. Contrary to the bijective case; however,
the distribution Df is no longer entirely supported on ⊥; but
we show that it still can be made to have a fairly small
support; roughly poly(n, log |F|). More precisely, the proof
shows non-malleability with respect to the choice of Df which
is explicitly defined to be the distribution of the following
random variable:
D :=

same if f(Un) = Un,
Dec(f(Un)) if f(Un) 6= Un and f(Un) ∈ H,
⊥ otherwise,
where H ⊆ {0, 1}n is the set of heavy elements formally
defined as
H := {x ∈ {0, 1}n : Pr[f(Un) = x] > 1/r},
for an appropriately chosen r = Θ(2t).
Remark 11. By inspecting the above recipe for the distribu-
tion Df in Definition 4, we see that the set of heavy elements
H would be empty whenever the tampering function f is such
that the min-entropy of the random variable f(Un) is at least
log r. By plugging in the final choices of r and t as derived
later in (20) and (21), we see that the required min-entropy
lower bound is
log log(|F|2n/η) + 4 log(1/) +O(1).
7In particular, when F| 6 22αn for some α ∈ (0, 1) and, say,
η = 2−n, there are no heavy elements provided that the min-
entropy4 of f(Un) is at least
αn+ log n+ 4 log(1/) +O(1).
In this case, the distribution Df becomes fully supported on
{same,⊥}, which means whenever any tampering occurs, the
coding scheme is able to detect an error. Moreover, when in
addition to the above the function f has few fixed points;
namely, when Pr[f(U) = U ] = O() for U ∼ Un, one can
take Df to be the singleton distribution having its whole mass
on the error symbol ⊥ (at the cost of a constant factor increase,
from  to O(), in the error parameter). This is for example
the case when the family of tampering functions consists of
additive noise functions (i.e., f(x) = x + e for some e ∈
{0, 1}n), and in this special case we derive a construction
of Algebraic Manipulation Detection codes (as defined in [3])
achieving rate 1−o(1) that are always able to detect tampering
whenever it happens.
Although the above intuition is natural, turning it into
a rigorous proof requires substantially more work than the
bijective case, and the final proof turns out to be rather delicate
even though it only uses elementary probability tools. The first
subtlety is that revealing the decoder at the heavy elements
creates dependencies between various random variables used
in the analysis. In order to make the proof more intuitive,
we introduce a random process, described as an algorithm
Reveal, that gradually reveals information about the code as
the proof considers the codewords E1, . . . , Et corresponding
to the picked message s. The process outputs a list of elements
in {0, 1}k, and we show that the empirical distribution of this
list is close to the desired Df for all messages s.
Roughly speaking, at each step i ∈ [t] the analysis estimates
the distribution of Dec(f(Ei)) conditioned on the particular
realizations of the previous codewords. There are three sub-
tleties that we need to handle to make this work:
1) The randomness corresponding to some of the Ei is
previously revealed by the analysis and thus such code-
words cannot be assumed to be uniformly distributed
any more. This issue may arise due to the revealing of
the decoder’s values at heavy elements in the beginning
of analysis, or existence of cycles in the evaluation graph
of the tampering function f . Fortunately, it is straightfor-
ward to show that the number of such codewords remain
much smaller than t with high probability, and thus they
may simply be ignored.
2) At each step of the analysis, the revealed information
make the distribution of Dec(f(Ei)) gradually farther
from the desired Df . The proof ensures that the expected
increase at each step is small, and using standard Martin-
gale concentration bounds the total deviation from Df
remains sufficiently small with high probability at the
end of the analysis.
4 Recall that the min-entropy of a distribution X over a discrete set Ω is
defined as H∞(X ) := minx∈Ω log(1/X (x)).
3) Obtaining small upper bounds (e.g., exp(−cn) for some
c < 1) on the probability of various bad events in
the analysis (e.g., Dec(f(Enc(s))) significantly devi-
ating from Df ) is not difficult to achieve. However,
extra care is needed to ensure that the probabilities are
much smaller than 1/(2k|F|) (to accommodate the final
union bound), where the latter may easily be doubly-
exponentially small in n. An exponential upper bound
of exp(−cn) does not even suffice for moderately large
families of adversaries such as bit-tampering adversaries,
for which we have |F| = 4n.
2) Complete proof of Theorem 9: First, observe that by
construction, the minimum distance of the final code is al-
ways greater than δn; that is, whenever Dec(w1) 6=⊥ and
Dec(w2) 6=⊥ for any pair of vectors w1 6= w2, we have
disth(w1, w2) > δn,
where disth(·) denotes the Hamming distance. This is because
whenever a codeword is picked, its δn neighborhood is re-
moved from the sample space for the future codewords. Let
V denote the volume of a Hamming ball of radius δn. It is
well known that V 6 2nh(δ), where h(·) is the binary entropy
function.
Fix an adversary f ∈ F . We wish to show that the coding
scheme (Enc,Dec) defined by Construction 1 is non-malleable
with high probability for the chosen f .
Let the random variable U := Un be a uniformly random
element in {0, 1}n. Define p0 := Pr[f(U) = U ]. In the sequel,
assume that p0 < 1 (otherwise, there is nothing to prove). For
every x ∈ {0, 1}n, define p(x) := Pr[f(U) = x ∧ x 6= U ].
Observe that ∑
x
p(x) = 1− p0.
We say that a string x ∈ {0, 1}n is heavy if
p(x) > 1/r,
for a parameter r 6 t to be determined later. Note that the
number of heavy strings must be less than r. Define
H := {x ∈ {0, 1}n : p(x) > 1/r},
γ := t/N,
γ′ := tK/N.
Fix the randomness of the code construction so that Dec(x)
is revealed for every heavy x. We will argue that no matter
how the decoder’s outcome on heavy elements is decided by
the randomness of the code construction, the construction is
non-malleable for every message s and the chosen function f
with overwhelming probability. We will then finish the proof
with a union bound over all choices of s and f .
Consider a random variable D defined over {0, 1}k ∪ {⊥
, same} in the following way:
D :=

same if f(Un) = Un,
Dec(f(Un)) if f(Un) 6= Un and f(Un) ∈ H,
⊥ otherwise.
(5)
8For the chosen f , we explicitly define the distribution Df as
Df := D(D).
Now, consider a fixed message s ∈ {0, 1}k, and define
the random variable Es := Enc(s). That is, Es is uniformly
supported on the set E(s) (this holds by the way that the
encoder is defined). Observe that the marginal distribution of
each individual set E(s) (with respect to the randomness of the
code construction) is the same for all choices of s, regardless
of the ordering assumed by Construction 1 on the message
space {0, 1}k.
Furthermore, define the random variable Ds as follows.
Ds :=
{
same if f(Es) = Es,
Dec(f(Es)) otherwise.
(6)
Our goal is to show that the distribution of Ds (for the final
realization of the code) is -close to Df with high probability
over the randomness of the code construction. Such assertion
is quite intuitive by comparing the way the two distributions
Ds and Df are defined. In fact, it is not hard to show that the
assertion holds with probability 1 − exp(−Ω(n)). However,
such a bound would be insufficient to accommodate a union
bound of even moderate sizes such as 2n, which is needed
for relatively simple classes such as bit-tampering adversaries.
More work needs to be done to ensure that it is possible to
achieve a high probability statement with failure probability
much smaller than 1/|F|, which may in general be doubly
exponentially small in n.
The claim below shows that closeness of D(Ds) to Df
would imply non-malleability of the code.
Claim 12. Suppose that for every s ∈ {0, 1}k, we have
D(Ds) ≈ Df for the choice of Df defined in (5). Then,
(Enc,Dec) is a non-malleable coding scheme with error  and
a strong non-malleable coding scheme with error 2.
Proof. In order to verify Definition 6, we need to verify
that for every pair of distinct messages s1, s2 ∈ {0, 1}k,
D(Ds1) ≈2 D(Ds2). But from the assumption, we know
that D(Ds1) and D(Ds2) are both -close to Df . Thus the
result follows by the triangle inequality.
It is of course possible now to use [1, Theorem 3.1] to
deduce that Definition 4 is also satisfied. However, for the
clarity of presentation, here we give a direct argument that
shows that non-malleability is satisfied with the precise choice
of Df defined in (5) and error . Let s ∈ {0, 1}k, and let Es :=
Enc(s) and S := Dec(f(Es)). Let S′ ∼ Df and S′′ ∼ D(Ds)
be sampled independently. We need to show that
D(S) ≈ D(copy(S′, s)). (7)
From the definition of Ds in (6), since Dec(f(Es)) =
s when f(Es) = Es, we see that D(copy(S′′, s)) =
D(Dec(f(Es))) = D(S). Now, since by assumption
D(S′) ≈ D(S′′), it follows that D(copy(S′, s)) ≈
D(copy(S′′, s)) which proves (7).
Let the random variables E1, . . . , Et be the elements of
E(s), in the order they are sampled by Construction 1 (note
the integer subscript, which is to be distinguished from the
notation Es = Enc(s) whose subscript is a k-bit string).
Define, for i ∈ [t],
Si :=
{
same if f(Ei) = Ei,
Dec(f(Ei)) otherwise.
We note that, no matter how the final code is realized by
the randomness of the construction, the distribution Ds is
precisely the empirical distribution5 of S1, . . . , St as deter-
mined by the code construction. To see this, note that the
message s corresponds to t codewords E1, . . . , Et, one of
which randomly chosen by the encoder when the message
s is given. Moreover, Si determines the decoding of the ith
codeword after being tampered by the adversary f (with the
special symbol same reserved for when f does not tamper
the codeword). Therefore, the empirical distribution of the
Si (which is the distribution obtained by outputting Si for
uniformly random i ∈ [t]) is precisely the distribution of
Dec(f(Enc(s))) (again reserving same for when f does not
tamper the encoding), which is how Ds is defined.
Observe that the random variables S1, . . . Si−1 are not
independent (for example, the knowledge of S1 = s would
skew the distribution of E2 which in turn would affect
the distribution of S2). However, our goal is to set up the
parameters so that the distribution of each Si is not affected
by much conditioned on S1, . . . , Si−1. Thus in the sequel,
for each i ∈ [t], we analyze the distribution of the variable
Si conditioned on the values of S1, . . . Si−1 and use this
analysis to prove that the empirical distribution of the sequence
(S1, . . . , St) is close to Df .
In order to understand the empirical distribution of the Si
(conditioned on the previous ones S1, . . . , Si−1), we consider
the following process Reveal that considers the picked code-
words E1, . . . , Et in order, gradually reveals information about
the code construction, and outputs a subset of the Si. We will
ensure that
1) The process outputs a large subset of {S1, . . . , St}, and,
2) The empirical distribution of the sequence output by the
process is close to Df with high probability.
The above guarantees would in turn imply that the empirical
distribution of the entire sequence Si is also close to Df with
high probability. We define the process as follows.
Process Reveal::
1. Initialize the set Skip ⊆ [t] with the empty set. Recall
that the values of Dec(w) for all w ∈ H are already
revealed in the analysis, as well as Dec(Γ(w)) for
those for which Dec(w) 6=⊥.
2. For each heavy element w ∈ H , if Dec(w) = s,
consider the unique j ∈ [t] such that Ej = w.
5Recall the definition of empirical distribution from the preliminaries
section.
9Reveal6 j and Ej , and add j to Skip.
3. For i from 1 to t, define the ith stage as follows:
3.1. If i ∈ Skip, declare a skip and continue the
loop with the next i. Otherwise, follow the
remaining steps.
3.2. Reveal Γ(Ei). Note that revealing Ei im-
plies that Dec(Ei) is revealed as well, since
Dec(Ei) = s. Moreover, recall that for any
x ∈ Γ(Ei) \ Ei, Dec(x) =⊥ by the code
construction.
3.3. If Dec(f(Ei)) is not already revealed:
3.3.1. Reveal Dec(f(Ei)).
3.2.2. If Dec(f(Ei)) = s, consider the
unique j ∈ [t] such that Ej = f(Ei).
It must be that j > i, since Dec(Ej)
has not been revealed before. Reveal
j and add it to Skip.
3.3.3. Declare that an unveil has happened
if Dec(f(Ei)) 6=⊥. If so, reveal
Dec(f(x)) for all x ∈ Γ(f(Ei)) \Ei
to equal ⊥.
3.4. Reveal and output Si.
For i ∈ [t], we use the notation Reveali to refer to all the
information revealed from the beginning of the process up to
the time the ith stage begins. We also denote by Next(i) the
least j > i such that a skip does not occur at stage j; define
Next(i) := t+ 1 if no such j exists, and define Next(0) to be
the index of the first stage that is not skipped. Moreover, for
w ∈ {0, 1}n, we use the notation w ∈ Reveali as a shorthand
to denote the event that the process Reveal has revealed the
value of Dec(w) at the time the ith stage begins.
By the way the code is constructed, the decoder’s value at
each given point is most likely ⊥. We make this intuition more
rigorous and show that the same holds even conditioned on
the information revealed by the process Reveal.
Claim 13. For all i ∈ [t] and any a ∈ supp(Reveali) and any
x ∈ {0, 1}n,
Pr[Dec(x) 6=⊥| (Reveali = a) ∧ (x /∈ Reveali)]
6 γ′/(1− 3γV ),
where the probability is over the randomness of the code
construction.
Proof. Suppose x /∈ Reveali, and observe that Reveali at
each step reveals at most the values of the decoder at 2V
points; namely, Γ(Ei) and Γ(f(Ei)). Moreover, before the
first stage, decoder’s value is revealed at up to r heavy points
and its Hamming neighborhood at radius δn. In total, the total
6In a rigorous sense, by revealing a random variable we mean that we
condition the probability space on the event that a particular value is assumed
by the variable. For example, revealing Ei means that the analysis branches
to a conditional world where the value of Ei is fixed to the revealed value.
In an intuitive sense, one may think of a reveal as writing constraints on the
realization of the code construction on a blackboard, which is subsequently
consulted by the analysis (in form of the random variable Reveali that the
analysis defines to denote the information revealed by the process before stage
i).
number of points at which decoder’s value is revealed by the
information in Reveali is at most
(|H|+ 2(i− 1))|V | 6 (2t+ r)V 6 3γV N.
Let
C :=
⋃
s
E(s)
be the set of all codewords of the coding scheme. Some of
the elements of C are already included in Reveali, and by
assumption we know that none of these is equal to x.
The distribution of each unrevealed codeword, seen in
isolation, is uniform over the N(1− 3γV ) remaining vectors
in {0, 1}n. Thus by taking a union bound on the probability
of each such codeword hitting the point x (which is the only
way to make Dec(x) 6=⊥, we deduce that
Pr[Dec(x) 6=⊥| Reveali = a] 6 tK
N(1− 3γV )
= γ′/(1− 3γV ).
Ideally, for each i ∈ [t] we desire to have Ei almost
uniformly distributed, conditioned on the revealed information,
so that the distribution of Dec(f(Ei)) (which is described
by Si when Ei does not hit a fixed point of f ) becomes
close to Dec(f(Un)). However, this is not necessarily true; for
example, when the process Reveal determines the decoder’s
value on the heavy elements, the value of, say, E1 may be
revealed, at which point there is no hope to ensure that E1 is
nearly uniform. This is exactly what the set Skip is designed
for, to isolate the instances when the value of Ei is already
determined by the prior information. More precisely, we have
the following.
Claim 14. Suppose that i /∈ Skip when the ith stage of Reveal
begins. Then, for any a ∈ supp(Reveali),
D(Ei | Reveali = a) ≈ν Un,
where ν := (3γV )/(1− 3γV ).
Proof. Note that, without any conditioning, the distribution
of Ei is exactly uniform on {0, 1}n. If at any point prior to
reaching the ith stage it is revealed that Dec(Ei) = s, either
line 2 or line 3.2.2 of process Reveal ensures that i is added
to the set Skip.
If, on the other hand, the fact that Dec(Ei) = s has not
been revealed when the ith stage begins, the distribution of
Ei becomes uniform on the points in {0, 1}n that have not
been revealed yet. As in Claim 13, the number of revealed
points is at most (2t + r)V 6 3γV N . Thus, the conditional
distribution Ei remains ((3γV )/(1− 3γV ))-close to uniform
by Proposition 32.
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For each i ∈ [t], define a random variable S′i ∈ {0, 1}k ∪
{same,⊥} as follows (where Un is independently sampled
from Un):
S′i :=

same if f(Un) = Un,
Dec(f(Un)) if f(Un) 6= Un ∧ f(Un) ∈ Reveali,
⊥ otherwise.
(8)
Note that D(S′1) = Df .
Intuitively, S′i is the “cleaned up” version of the random
variable Si that we are interested in. As defined, S′i is an in-
dependent random variable, and as such we are more interested
in its distribution than value. Observe that the distribution of
S′i is randomly determined according to the randomness of
the code construction (in particular, the knowledge of Reveali
completely determines D(S′i)). The variable S
′
i is defined so
that its distribution approximates the distribution of the actual
Si conditioned on the revealed information before stage i.
Formally, we can show that conditional distributions of these
two variables are (typically) similar. Namely,
Claim 15. Suppose that i /∈ Skip when the ith stage of Reveal
begins. Then, for any a ∈ supp(Reveali),
D(Si | Reveali = a) ≈ν D(S′i | Reveali = a),
where ν := (3γV + γ′)/(1− 3γV ).
Proof. First, we apply Claim 14 to ensure that
D(Ei | Reveali = a) ≈ν′ Un,
where ν′ = (3γV )/(1− 3γV ). Thus we can assume that the
conditional distribution of Ei is exactly uniform at cost of a
ν′ increase in the final estimate.
Now, observe that, conditioned on the revealed information,
the way Si is sampled at stage i of Reveal can be rewritten
as follows:
1) Sample Ei ∼ Un.
2) If f(Ei) = Ei, set Si ← same.
3) Otherwise, if f(Ei) ∈ Reveali, set Si to Dec(f(Ei)) as
determined by the revealed information.
4) Otherwise, reveal Dec(f(Ei)) (according to its condi-
tional distribution on the knowledge of Reveali) and set
S accordingly.
This procedure is exactly the same as how S′i is sampled
by (8); with the difference that at the third step, S′i is set to ⊥
whereas Si is sampled according to the conditional distribution
of Dec(f(Ei)). However, we know by Claim 13 that in this
case,
Pr[Dec(f(Ei)) 6=⊥| Reveali = a] 6 γ′/(1− 3γV ).
Thus we see that Si changes the probability mass of ⊥ in
D(S′i) by at most γ
′/(1− 3γV ). The claim follows.
Recall that the distribution of S′1 is the same as Df .
However, for subsequent stages this distribution may deviate
from Df . We wish to ensure that by the end of process Reveal,
the deviation remains sufficiently small.
For i ∈ [t− 1], define ∆i as
∆i := dist(D(S
′
i+1),D(S
′
i)).
where dist(·) denotes statistical distance. Note that ∆i is
a random variable that is determined by the knowledge of
Reveali+1 (recall that Reveali determines the exact distribution
of S′i). We show that the conditional values attained by this
random variable are small in expectation.
Claim 16. For each i ∈ [t− 1], and all a ∈ supp(Reveali),
E[∆i | Reveali = a] 6 2γ
′
r(1− 3γV ) , (9)
Moreover, Pr[∆i 6 2/r | Reveali = a] = 1 (the expectation
and the probability are over the randomness of the code
construction).
Proof. Recall that the distribution of S′i+1 is different from
S′i depending on the points at which the decoder’s value is
revealed during stage i of Reveal. If a skip is declared at stage
i, we have Reveali+1 = Reveali and thus, ∆i = 0. Thus in
the following we may assume that this is not the case.
However, observe that whenever for some x ∈ {0, 1}n,
the decoder’s value Dec(x) is revealed at stage i, the new
information affects the probability distribution of S′i only if
Dec(x) 6=⊥. This is because when Dec(x) =⊥, some of the
probability mass assigned by Si to ⊥ in (8) is removed and
reassigned by S′i+1 to Dec(x), which is still equal to ⊥. Thus,
changes of this type can have no effect on the distribution
of S′i. We conclude that only revealing the value of Ei and
an unveil (as defined in line 3.3.3 of process Reveal) can
contribute to the statistical distance between S′i and S
′
i+1.
Whenever an unveil occurs at stage i, say at point x ∈
{0, 1}n, some of the probability mass assigned to ⊥ by S′i
is moved to Dec(x) in the distribution of S′i+1. Since we
know that x /∈ H , the resulting change in the distance between
the two distributions is bounded by 1/r, no matter what the
realization of x and Dec(x) are. Overall, using Claim 13, the
expected change between the two distributions contributed by
the occurrence of an unveil is upper bounded by the probability
of an unveil occurring times 1/r, which is at most
γ′/r
1− 3γV . (10)
The only remaining factor that may contribute to an increase
in the distance between distribution of S′i and S
′
i+1 is the
revealing of Ei at stage i. The effect of this reveal in the
statistical distance between the two distributions is p(Ei),
since according to (8) the value of S′i+1 is determined by the
outcome of f(Un), and thus the probability mass assigned to
Dec(Ei) by S′i+1 is indeed Pr[f(Un) = Ei]. Let DE be the
distribution of Ei conditioned on the knowledge of Reveali.
Observe that, since the values {p(x) : x ∈ {0, 1}n} defines a
probability distribution on N points, we clearly have∑
x∈supp(DE)
p(x) 6 1. (11)
On the other hand, by the assumption that a skip has not
occurred at stage i, we can deduce using the argument in
11
Claim 14 that DE is uniformly supported on a support of
size at least N(1− 3γV ). Therefore, using (11), the expected
contribution to ∆i by the revealing of Ei is (which is the
expected value of p(Ei)) is at most
1
N(1− 3γV ) 6
γ′/r
(1− 3γV ) , (12)
where the inequality uses r 6 γ′N = tK. The desired bound
follows by adding up the two perturbations (10) and (12)
considered.
Finally, observe that each of the perturbations considered
above cannot be more than 1/r, since stage i never reveals
the decoder’s value on a heavy element (recall that all heavy
elements are revealed before the first stage begins and the
choices of Ei that correspond to heavy elements are added to
Skip when Reveal begins). Thus, the conditional value of ∆i
is never more than 2/r.
Using the above result, we can deduce a concentration
bound on the summation of the differences ∆i.
Claim 17. Let ∆ := ∆1 + · · ·+ ∆t−1, and suppose
γ′
1− 3γV 6
r
32t
. (13)
Then,
Pr[∆ > /8] 6 exp(−2r2/(2048t)) =: η0, (14)
where the probability is over the randomness of the code
construction.
Proof. For i ∈ [t − 1], define ∆′i := ∆ir/2, ∆′0 := 0, and
∆′ := ∆′1 + · · · + ∆′t−1. Since Reveali determines ∆′i−1, by
Claim 16 we know that
E[∆′i | ∆′0, . . . ,∆′i−1] 6 ν,
where ν := γ
′
1−3γV 6 r/(32t) In the above, conditioning on
∆′0, . . . ,∆
′
i−1 instead of Reveali (for which Claim 16 applies),
is valid in light of Proposition 31, since the knowledge of
Reveali determines ∆′0, . . . ,∆
′
i−1.
Moreover, again by the Claim 16, we know that the ∆′i are
between 0 and 1. Using Proposition 33, it follows that
Pr[∆ > /8] = Pr[∆′ > r
16t
· t] 6 η0.
Next, we prove a concentration bound for the total number
of unveils that can occur in line 3.3.3 of process Reveal.
Claim 18. Let u be the total number of unveils that occur
in process Reveal. Assuming γ′/(1 − 3γV ) 6 /8 (which is
implied by (13)), we have
Pr[u > t/4] 6 exp(−2t/128) 6 η0,
where the probability is over the randomness of the code
construction.
Proof. Let X1, . . . , Xt be indicator random variable such that
Xi = 1 iff an unveil occurs at stage i, and let X0 := 0. Recall
that an unveil can only occur at a stage that is not skipped.
Thus, if i ∈ [t] when the ith stage begins, we can deduce that
Xi = 0.
Consider i ∈ [t] such that i /∈ Skip when the ith stage
begins. An unveil occurs when Dec(f(Ei)) /∈ Reveali. In this
case, by Claim 13, we get that
Pr[Dec(f(Ei)) 6=⊥| Reveali] 6 γ′/(1− 3γV ).
Since Reveali determines all the revealed information in each
prior stage, and in particular the values of X0, . . . , Xi−1, we
can use Proposition 31 to deduce that
Pr[Xi = 1 | X0, . . . , Xi−1] 6 γ′/(1− 3γV ).
Finally, Proposition 33 derives the desired concentration bound
on the number of unveils, which is X1 + · · ·+Xt.
We are now ready to wrap up the proof and show that
with overwhelming probability, the empirical distribution of
S1, . . . , St is -close to Df .
Suppose that process Reveal outputs a subset of the Si.
Let T ⊆ [t] be the set of indices i such Reveal outputs Si
in the end of the ith stage. Note that T = [t] \ Skip, where
Skip denotes the skip set when Reveal terminates. Observe
that |Skip| is at most the total number of unveils occurring at
line 3.3.3 of Reveal plus r (which upper bounds the number
of heavy elements in H). Thus, using Claim 18 we see that,
assuming (13),
Pr[t− |T | > r + t/4] 6 η0. (15)
Let δi for i ∈ [t] denote the statistical distance between S′i
and Df . We know that δi is a random variable depending on
Reveali. Thus, the value of δi becomes known to a particular
fixed value conditioned on the outcome of every Revealj ,
j > i. Define δ0 := maxi δi, which is a random variable
that becomes revealed by the knowledge of Revealt in the end
of the process.
Using Claim 15, we thus know that for any a ∈
supp(Reveali) and i ∈ T ,
D(Si | Reveali = a) ≈ν0+δ0 Df ,
where
ν0 := (3γV + γ
′)/(1− 3γV ).
Let S denote the empirical distribution of {Si : i ∈ T}, and
define S0 :=⊥. From the above conclusion, using Proposi-
tion 31 we can now write, for i ∈ T ,
D(Si | (Sj : j ∈ T ∩ {1, . . . , i− 1}) ≈ν0+δ0 Df .
Recall that |supp(Df )| 6 r + 2. Assuming that
ν0 + δ0 6 /4, (16)
Proposition 38 implies (after simple manipulations) that with
probability 1− η1, where
η1 6 2r+4−Ω(
2|T |), (17)
S is (/2)-close to Df .
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Recall that D(S′1) = Df . Using the triangle inequality for
statistical distance, for every i ∈ [t] we can write
dist(S′i,Df ) = dist(S′i, S′1) 6 ∆1 + · · ·+ ∆i−1 6 ∆,
and thus deduce that δ0 6 ∆. Recall that by Claim 17, we
can ensure that, assuming (13), ∆ 6 /8 (and thus, δ0 6 /8)
with probability at least 1 − η0. Thus under the assumption
that
ν0 6 /8, (18)
and (13), which we recall below
γ′
1− 3γV 6
r
32t
,
we can ensure that ν0 + δ0 6 /4 with probability at least
1−η0. Moreover, conditioned on the event ν0+δ0 6 /4 (recall
that δ0 is a random variable), we have already demonstrated
that with probability at least 1 − η1, S is (/2)-close to Df .
After removing conditioning on the bound on δ0, we may
deduce that overall (under the assumed inequalities (13) and
(18)), with probability at least 1−O(η0 + η1),
S ≈/2 Df ,
which in turn, implies that the empirical distribution of
S1, . . . , St becomes ′-close to uniform, where
′ := /2 + (1− |T |/t).
Finally, we can use (15) to ensure that (assuming (13)), ′ 6 
and |T |/t > 1− /2 with probability at least 1−O(η0 + η1)
as long as
r 6 t/4. (19)
By comparing (17) with (14), we also deduce that η1 = O(η0)
(and also that (19) holds) as long as r 6 r0 for some
r0 = Ω(
2t). (20)
Altogether, we arrive at the conclusion that under assump-
tions (13), (18), and by taking r := r0, with probability at
least 1−O(η0),
(empirical distribution of (S1, . . . , St)) ≈ Df ,
which ensures the required non-malleability condition for
message s and tampering function f . By taking a union bound
over all possible choices of s and f , the probability of failure
becomes bounded by
O(η0K|F|) =: η2.
We can now ensure that η2 6 η for the chosen value for r
by taking t > t0 for some
t0 = O
(
1
6
(
log
|F|N
η
))
. (21)
Furthermore, in order to satisfy assumptions (13), (18), and
the requirement tKV 6 1 which is needed to make the
construction possible, it suffices to have K 6 K0 for some
K0 = Ω(
3N/(tV )).
Using the bound V 6 2nh(δ), where h(·) is the binary entropy
function, and taking the logarithm of both sides, we see that
it suffices to have k 6 k0 for some
k0 > n(1− h(δ))− log t− 3 log(1/)−O(1).
This concludes the proof of Theorem 9.
C. Efficiency in the random oracle model
One of the main motivations of the notion of non-malleable
codes proposed in [1] is the application for tamper-resilient
security. In this application, a stateful system consists of a
public functionality and a private state s ∈ {0, 1}k. The state
is stored in form of its non-malleable encoding, which is prone
to tampering by a family of adversaries. It is shown in [1]
that the security of the system with encoded private state can
be guaranteed (in a naturally defined sense) provided that the
distribution Df related to the non-malleable code is efficiently
samplable. In light of Remark 8, efficient sampling of Df
can be assured if the non-malleable code is equipped with an
efficient encoder and decoder.
Although the code described by Construction 1 may re-
quire exponential time to even describe, it makes sense to
consider efficiency of the encoder and the decoder in the
random oracle model, where all involved parties have oracle
access to a shared, exponentially long, random string. The
uniform decoder construction of [1] is shown to be efficiently
implementable in the random oracle model in an approximate
sense (as long as all involved parties query the random
oracle a polynomial number of times), assuming existence
of an efficient algorithm implementing a uniformly random
permutation Π (over {0, 1}n) and its inverse Π−1.
We observe that Construction 1, for the distance parameter
δ = 0 (which is what needed for strong non-malleability
as originally defined in [1]) can be exactly implemented
efficiently (without any further assumptions on boundedness
of the access to the random oracle) assuming access to
a uniformly random permutation and its inverse (i.e., the
so-called ideal-cipher model). This is because our code is
designed so that the codewords are picked uniformly at random
and without replacement. More precisely, the encoder, given
message s ∈ {0, 1}k, can sample a uniformly random i ∈ [t],
and output Π(φ(s, i)), where φ : {0, 1}k×[t]→ {0, 1}n is any
fixed injective function that interprets (s, i) as an element of
{0, 1}n (recall the the code construction assumes t2k 6 2n).
As noted in [1], efficient approximate implementations of
uniformly random permutations exist in the random oracle
model. In particular, [13] (following [14]) shows such an ap-
proximation with security poly(q)/2n, where q is the number
of queries to the random oracle.
IV. A MONTE CARLO CONSTRUCTION FOR
COMPUTATIONALLY BOUNDED ADVERSARIES
An important feature of Construction 1 is that the proof of
non-malleability, Theorem 9, only uses limited independence
of the permutation defining the codewords E(s) corresponding
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to each message. This is because the proof analyzes the
distribution of Dec(f(Enc(s))) for each individual message
separately, and then takes a union bound on all choice of s.
More formally, below we show that Theorem 9 holds
for a broader range of code constructions than the exact
Construction 1.
Definition 19 (`-wise independent schemes). Let (Enc,Dec)
be any randomized construction of a coding scheme with block
length n and message length k. For each s ∈ {0, 1}k, define
E(s) := supp(Enc(s)) and let ts := |supp(Enc(s))|. We say
that the construction is `-wise independent if the following are
satisfied.
1) For any realization of (Enc,Dec), the distribution of
Enc(s) (with respect to the internal randomness of Enc)
is uniform on supp(Enc(s)).
2) The distribution of the codewords defined by the con-
struction is `-wise independent. Formally, we require the
following. Let C := ⋃s∈{0,1}k supp(Enc(s)). Suppose
the construction can be described by a deterministic
function7 E : {0, 1}k × N × N → {0, 1}n such that
for a bounded random oracle O over N (describing the
random bits used by the construction), the sequence
(E(s, i,O))s∈{0,1}k,i∈[ts]
enumerates the set C. Moreover, for any set of distinct
t indices S = {(sj , ij) : j ∈ [`], sj ∈ {0, 1}k, ij ∈ [ts]},
we have
D(E(s1, i1,O), . . . , E(s`, i`,O)) = D(Π(1), . . . ,Π(`))
for a uniformly random bijection Π: [2n]→ {0, 1}n.
Lemma 20. Let (Enc,Dec) be any randomized construction
of a coding scheme with block length n and message length k.
For each s ∈ {0, 1}k, define E(s) := supp(Enc(s)). Suppose
that for any realization of (Enc,Dec), and for every s1, s2 ∈
{0, 1}k, we have
1) |E(s1)| > t0, where t0 is the parameter defined in
Theorem 9.
2) |E(s2)| = O(|E(s1)|).
Moreover, suppose that k 6 k0, for k0 as in Theorem 9.
Let t := maxs |E(s)|. Then, assuming that the construction
is (3t)-wise independent, the conclusion of Theorem 9 for
distance parameter δ = 0 holds for the coding scheme
(Enc,Dec).
Proof. We argue that the proof of Theorem 9 holds without
any technical change if
1) The codewords in supp(Enc(Uk)) are chosen not fully
independently but (3t)-wise independently, and
2) Each set E(s) is not necessarily of exact size t but of
size at least t0 and Θ(t).
7As an example, in Construction 1, all the values ts are equal to
the chosen t, and moreover, one can take E(s, i,O) = Π(s, i), where
Π: {0, 1}k× [2n−k]→ {0, 1}n is a uniformly random bijection defined by
the randomness of O.
The key observation to be made is that the proof analyzes each
individual message s ∈ {0, 1}k separately, and then applies a
union bound on all choices of s. Thus we only need sufficient
independence to ensure that the view of the analysis on each
individual choice of the message is statistically the same as
the case where the codewords are chosen fully independently.
Observe that the bulk of the information about the code
looked up by the analysis for analyzing each individual
message is contained in the random variable Revealt+1 defined
in the proof of Theorem 9, that is defined according to how
the process Reveal evolves. Namely, Revealt+1 summarizes
all the information revealed about the code by the end of the
process Reveal.
For a fixed message s ∈ {0, 1}n the process Reveal iterates
for |E(s)| 6 t step. At each step, the location of at most two
codewords in supp(Enc(Uk)) is revealed. Moreover, before
the process starts, the values of the decoder on the heavy
elements in H , which can correspond to less than t codewords,
are revealed by the process. The only other place in the
proof where an independent codeword is required is the union
bound in the proof of Claim 13, which needs another degree
of independence. Altogether, we conclude that the proof of
Theorem 9 only uses at most 3t degrees of independence in
the distribution of the codewords picked by the construction.
Moreover, for each message s, the analysis uses the fact
that |E(s)| > t0 to ensure that the code does not satisfy non-
malleability for the given choice of s and tampering function
remains below the desired level. Since |E(s)| for different
values of s are assumed to be within a constant factor of
each other, the requirement (20) may also be satisfied by an
appropriate choice of the hidden constant. Finally, using the
fact that maxs |E(s)| = O(mins |E(s)|), we can also ensure
that assumptions (13), and (18) can be satisfied for appropriate
choices of the hidden constants in asymptotic bounds.
In order to implement an efficient `-wise independent cod-
ing scheme, we use the bounded independence property of
polynomial evaluations over finite fields. More precisely, we
consider the coding scheme given in Construction 2.
The advantage of using the derandomized Monte Carlo
construction is that the number of random bits required to
describe the code is dramatically reduced from O(tnK) bits
(which can be exponentially large if the rate of the code
is Ω(1)) to only O(tn) bits, which is only polynomially
large if t = poly(n). In order to efficiently implement the
derandomized construction, we use bounded independence
properties of polynomial evaluation. Using known algorithms
for finite field operations and root finding, the implementation
can be done in polynomial time.
Lemma 21. Consider the pair (EncMC,DecMC) defined in
Construction 2. For every η > 0, there is a t0 = O(n +
log(1/η)) such that for every t > t0 (where t is a power of
two), with probability at least 1− η the following hold.
1) (EncMC,DecMC) is a (9t)-wise independent coding
scheme.
2) For all s ∈ {0, 1}k, |supp(EncMC(s))| ∈ [t, 3t].
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• Given: Integer parameters 0 < k 6 n and integer t > 1
which is a power of two. Let b := log(2t) and m :=
n− k − b.
• Output: A coding scheme (EncMC,DecMC) of block
length n and message length k.
• Randomness of the construction: A uniformly random
polynomial P ∈ F2n [9t− 1].
• Construction of EncMC: Given s ∈ {0, 1}k,
1) Initialize a set E ⊆ {0, 1}n to the empty set.
2) For every z ∈ {0, 1}b,
a) Construct a vector y := (s, 0m, z) ∈ {0, 1}n and
regard it as an element of F2n .
b) Solve P (X) = y, and add the set of solutions
(which is of size at most 9t− 1) to E.
3) Output a uniformly random element of E.
• Construction of DecMC: Given x ∈ {0, 1}n, inter-
pret x as an element of F2n , and let y := P (x),
interpreted as a vector (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ {0, 1}n. If
(yk+1, yk+2, . . . , yk+m) = 0
m, output (y1, . . . , yk). Oth-
erwise, output ⊥.
Construction 2: The Monte Carlo Construction.
Proof. Let N := 2n and K := 2k. Consider the vector
X := (X1, . . . , XN ) ∈ FN2n , where Xi := P (i) and each
i is interpreted as an element of F2n . Since the polynomial P
is of degree 9t − 1, the distribution of X1, . . . , XN over the
randomness of the polynomial P is (9t)-wise independent with
each individual Xi being uniformly distributed on F2n . This
standard linear-algebraic fact easily follows from invertibility
of square Vandermonde matrices.
Note that the decoder function DecMC in Construction 2 is
defined so that
DecMC(Un) =
{
⊥ with probability 1− 2tK/N
s ∈ {0, 1}k with probability 2t/N.
(22)
For s ∈ {0, 1}k, let E(s) := supp(EncMC(s)). Note
that the encoder, given s, is designed to output a uniformly
random element of E(s). Since the definition of the EncMC(s)
is so that it exhausts the list of all possible words in
{0, 1}n that can lie in DecMC−1(s), it trivially follows that
(EncMC,DecMC) is always a valid coding scheme; that is,
for any realization of the code and for all s ∈ {0, 1}n, we
have DecMC(EncMC(s)) = s subject to the guarantee that
|E(s)| > 0.
Fix some s ∈ {0, 1}k. Let Z1, . . . , ZN ∈ {0, 1} be indicator
random variable such that Zi = 1 iff DecMC(i) = s (when
i is interpreted as an n-bit string). Recall that (Z1, . . . , ZN )
is a (9t)-wise independent random vector with respect to the
randomness of the code construction. Let Z := Z1 + · · ·+ZN ,
and note that Z = |E(s)|. From (22), we see that
E[Z] = E[|E(s)|] = 2t .
Using Theorem 36 with ` := t/4 and A := E[Z]/2 = t, we
see that
Pr[|Z − 2t| > t] 6 8(3/4)t/4.
By taking a union bound over all choices of s ∈ {0, 1}k, we
conclude that with probability at least 1−η0, where we define
η0 := 8N(3/4)
t/4, the realization of (EncMC,DecMC) is so
that
(∀s ∈ {0, 1}k) : |E(s)| ∈ [t, 3t].
This bound suffices to show the desired conclusion.
By combining the above tools with Theorem 9, we can de-
rive the following result on the performance of Construction 2.
Theorem 22. Let F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be any family of
tampering functions. For any , η > 0, with probability at least
1−η, the pair (EncMC,DecMC) in Construction 2 can be set
up to achieve a non-malleable coding scheme with respect to F
and with error . Moreover, the scheme satisfies the following.
1) The code achieves k > n − log log(|F|/η) − log n −
9 log(1/)−O(1).
2) The number of random bits needed to specify the code
is O
(
(n+ log(|F|/η))n/6
)
.
3) The encoder and the decoder run in worst case time
poly(log(|F|/η)n/).
Proof. Let t0 and k0 be the parameters promised by Theo-
rem 9. We instantiate Construction 2 with parameter t := t0
and k := k0. Observe that this choice of t is large enough
to allow Lemma 21 to hold. Thus we can ensure that, with
probability at least 1 − η, (EncMC,DecMC) is a (9t)-wise
independent coding scheme where, for every s ∈ {0, 1}k,
|E(s)| ∈ [t0, 3t0]. Thus we can now apply Lemma 20 to con-
clude that with probability at least 1− 2η, (EncMC,DecMC)
is a strong non-malleable code with the desired parameters.
The number of random bits required to represent the code
is the bit length of the polynomial P (X) in Construction 2,
which is 9tn. Plugging in the value of t from (21) gives the
desired estimate.
The running time of the decoder is dominated by evaluation
of the polynomial P (X) at a given point. Since the underlying
field is of characteristic two, a representation of the field as
well as basic field operations can be computed in deterministic
polynomial time in the degree n of the extension using Shoup’s
algorithm [15].
The encoder is, however, slightly more complicated as it
needs to iterate through O(t) steps, and at each iteration
compute all roots of a given degree 9t−1 polynomial. Again,
since characteristic of the underlying field is small, this task
can be performed in deterministic polynomial time in the
degree 9t − 1 of the polynomial and the degree n of the
extension (e.g., using [16]). After plugging in the bound on
t from (21), we obtain the desired bound on the running
time.
As a corollary, we observe that the rate of the Monte Carlo
construction can be made arbitrarily close to 1 while keeping
the bit-representation of the code as well as the running
time of the encoder and decoder at poly(n) provided that
 = 1/poly(n) and |F| = 2poly(n). In particular, we see that
the Monte Carlo construction achieves strong non-malleability
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even with respect to such powerful classes of adversaries as
polynomial-sized Boolean circuits (with n outputs bits) and
virtually any interesting computationally bounded model.
Remark 23. Since in this construction the error  is only
polynomially small, for cryptographic applications such as
tamper-resilient security it is important to set up the code so as
to ensure that 1/ is significantly larger than the total number
of tampering attempts made by the adversary.
Caveat. We point out that any explicit coding scheme for
computationally bounded models (such as polynomial-sized
Boolean circuits) necessarily implies an explicit lower bound
for the respective computational model. This is because a
function in the restricted model cannot be powerful enough
to compute the decoder function, as otherwise, the following
adversary would violate non-malleability:
Consider fixed tuples (s1, x1), (s2, x2) ∈ {0, 1}k ×
{0, 1}n, where s1 6= s2, Dec(x1) = s1 and
Dec(x2) = s2. Given a codeword x ∈ {0, 1}n,
compute s := Dec(x). If s = s1, output x2. If
s = s2, output x1. Otherwise, output x.
Remark 24. (Alternative Monte Carlo construction) In ad-
dition to Construction 2, it is possible to consider a related
Monte Carlo construction when polynomial evaluation is per-
formed at the encoder and root finding is done by the encoder.
More precisely, the encoder, given s ∈ {0, 1}k, may sample
i ∈ [t] uniformly at random, and output P (s, i) where (s, i) is
interpreted as an element of F2n (possibly after padding). The
drawback with this approach is that the rate of the code would
be limited by 1/2, since for larger rates there is a noticeable
chance that the encoder maps different messages to the same
codeword.
V. IMPOSSIBILITY BOUNDS
In this section, we show that the bounds obtained by
Theorem 9 are essentially optimal. In order to do so, we
consider three families of adversaries. Throughout the section,
we use k and n for the message length and block length of
coding schemes and define N := 2n and K := 2k.
A. General adversaries
The first hope is to demonstrate that Theorem 9 is the
best possible for every family of the tampering functions of a
prescribed size. We rule out this possibility and demonstrate
a family F of tampering functions achieving log log |F| ≈ n
for which there is a non-malleable code achieving rate 1− γ
for arbitrarily small γ > 0.
Let S ⊆ {0, 1}n be any set of size at least N1−α and at
most N/2. Consider the family F of functions satisfying the
property that
(∀f ∈ F)(∀x ∈ S) : f(x) = x.
We can take the union of such families over all choices of S;
however, for our purposes it suffices to define F with respect
to a single choice of S. Observe that
|F|NN−|S| > NN/2,
which implies
log log |F | > n− 1.
However, there is a trivial coding scheme that is non-malleable
with zero error for all functions in F . Namely, the encoder
Enc is a deterministic function that maps messages to distinct
elements of S, whereas the decoder Dec inverts the encoder
and furthermore, maps any string outside S to ⊥. In this
construction, we see that
(∀f ∈ F)(∀x ∈ {0, 1}k) : Dec(f(Enc(x))) = x,
since f necessarily fixes all the points in S (in particular, in
Definition 4 one can take Df := D(same)). Finally, observe
that the rate of this coding scheme is at least 1 − γ. In fact,
this result holds for any γ > 1/n, implying that the rate of
the code can be made 1− o(1).
B. Random adversaries
The observation in Section V-A rules out the hope for a
general lower bound that only depends on the size of the
adversarial family. However, in this section we show that for
“virtually all” families of tampering functions of a certain size,
Theorem 9 gives the best possible bound. More precisely,
we construct a family F of a designed size M as follows:
For each i ∈ [M ], sample a uniformly random function
fi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n and add fi to the family. Since some
of the fi may turn out to be the same (albeit with negligible
probability), |F| may in general be lower than M (which can
only make a lower bound stronger).
We prove the following.
Theorem 25. For any α > 0, there is an M0 satisfying
log logM0 6 αn+O(log n)
such that with probability 1 − exp(−n), a random family F
with designed size M > M0 satisfies the following: There is
no coding scheme achieving rate at least 1−α and error  < 1
that is non-malleable with respect to the tampering family F .
Proof. We begin with the following simple probabilistic argu-
ment:
Claim 26. Let C ⊆ [q]N be a multi-set of vectors each
chosen uniformly and independently at random. For any
integer ` ∈ [N ] and parameter γ > 0, there is an M0 =
O(`q` log(qN/γ)) such that as long as |C| > M0, the
following holds with probability at least 1 − γ: For every
S ⊆ [N ] with |S| 6 `, the set of vectors in C restricted to
the positions picked by S is equal to [q]|S|.
Proof. Fix any choice of the set S (where, without loss of
generality, |S| = `) and let CS be the set of vectors in C
restricted to the positions in S. For any w ∈ [q]|S , we have
Pr[w /∈ CS ] =
(
1− 1
q`
)|C|
6 exp(−Ω(|C|/q`)).
16
By taking a union bound on all the choices of w and S, the
probability that C does not satisfy the desired property can be
seen to be at most
(qN)` exp(−Ω(|C|/q`)),
which can be made no more than γ for some
|C| = O
(
q`(` log(qN) + log(1/γ))
)
.
Let γ > 0 be a parameter to be determined later. By
Claim 26, with probability at least 1− γ over the randomness
of the family F , we can ensure that for all sets S ⊆ {0, 1}n
of size at most 4Nα, and for all functions fS : S → {0, 1}n,
there is a function f ∈ F that agrees with fS on all points in
S. This guarantee holds if we take F >M0 for some
M0 = O
(
NαN (4N
α) log(N/γ)
)
.
Overestimating the above bound yields
log logM0 6 αn+ log log(N/γ) +O(1)
which is at most αn+O(log n) for γ = exp(−n). Assuming
that the family F attains the above-mentioned property, we
now proceed as follows.
Consider any coding scheme (Enc,Dec) with block length
n and message length k which is non-malleable for the family
F randomly constructed as above and achieving rate at least
1 − α for some α > 0 and any non-trivial error  < 1. For
any message s ∈ {0, 1}k, let
E(s) := supp(Enc(s)) ⊆ [N ]
and observe that E(s) ∩ E(s′) = ∅ for all s 6= s′. Observe
that
E[|E(Uk)|] 6 Nα
by the disjointness property of the E(s) and the assumption
on the rate of the code. By Markov’s bound,
Pr[|E(Uk)| > 2Nα] < 1/2
implying that for at least half of the choices of s ∈ {0, 1}k, we
can assume |E(s)| 6 2Nα. Take two distinct vectors s1, s2 ∈
{0, 1}k satisfying this bound.
Now, let S := E(s1) ∪E(s2), where |S| 6 4Nα as above.
Consider any c1 ∈ E(s1) and c2 ∈ E(s2) and define fS : S →
{0, 1}n such that
(∀x ∈ E(s1)) : fS(x) = c2,
and,
(∀x ∈ E(s2)) : fS(x) = c1.
By the choice of F , we know that there is f ∈ F that agrees
with fS on all the points in S. This choice of the adversary
ensures that
Pr[Dec(f(Enc(s1))) = s2] = 1
and
Pr[Dec(f(Enc(s2))) = s1] = 1
with respect to the randomness of the encoder. Since the
two distributions Dec(f(Enc(s1))) and Dec(f(Enc(s2))) are
maximally far from each other and moreover, the adversary f
always tampers codewords in E(s1) and E(s2) to a codeword
corresponding to a different message, we conclude that there is
no choice of Df in Definition 4 that ensures non-malleability
with any error less than 1.
C. General adversaries acting on a subset of positions
An important family of adversaries is the one that is only
restricted by the subset of bits it acts upon. More precisely, let
T ⊆ [n] be a fixed set of size αn, for a parameter α ∈ (0, 1).
For x ∈ {0, 1}n, we use the notation xT ∈ {0, 1}|T | for the
restriction of x to the positions in T . Without loss of generality,
assume that T contains the first |T | coordinate positions so that
x = (xT , xT¯ ), where T¯ := [n] \ T . We consider the family
FT of all functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n such that
f(x) = (g(xT ), xT¯ )
for some g : {0, 1}|T | → {0, 1}|T |. Observe that |FT | 6
N (αN
α) which implies log log |FT | 6 αn.
We prove the following lower bound, which is a variation of
the classical Singleton bound for non-malleable codes. What
makes this variation much more challenging to prove is the
fact that 1) non-malleable codes allow a randomized encoder,
and 2) non-malleability is a more relaxed requirement than
error detection, and hence the proof must rule out the case
where the decoder does not detect errors (i.e., outputs a wrong
message) while still satisfies non-malleability.
Theorem 27. Let T ⊆ [n] be of size αn and consider the
family FT of the tampering functions that only act on the
coordinate positions in T (as defined above). Then, there
is a δ0 = O((log n)/n) such that the following holds. Let
(Enc,Dec) be any coding scheme which is non-malleable for
the family FT and achieves rate 1−α+ δ, for any δ ∈ [δ0, α]
and error . Then,  > δ/(16α). In particular, when α and δ
are absolute constants,  = Ω(1).
Before proving the theorem, we state the following imme-
diate corollary.
Corollary 28. Let F be the family of split-state adversaries
acting on n bits. That is, each f ∈ F interprets the input as
a pair (x1, x2) where x2 ∈ {0, 1}bn/2c and x2 ∈ {0, 1}dn/2e,
and outputs (f1(x1), f2(x2)) for arbitrary tampering functions
f1 and f2 (acting on their respective input lengths).
Moreover, for a fixed constant δ ∈ (0, 1), let Fδ be the
class of tampering functions where f ∈ Fδ iff every bit of
f(x) depends on at most bδnc of the bits of x.
Let (Enc1,Dec1) (resp., (Encδ,Decδ) be any coding scheme
which is non-malleable for the class F (resp., Fδ) achieving
error at most  and rate R (resp., Rδ). Then, for every fixed
constant γ > 0, there is a fixed constant 0 > 0 such that if
 6 0, the following bounds hold.
(i) R 6 1/2− γ,
(ii) Rδ 6 1− δ − γ.
The proof of Theorem 27 uses basic tools from information
theory, and the core ideas can be described as follows. Assume
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that the codeword is (X1, X2) where the adversary acts on X1,
which is of length αn. We show that for any coding scheme
with rate slightly larger than (1 − α)n, there is a set Xη ⊆
{0, 1}αn such that
1) For some message s0, X1 lies in Xη with noticeable
probability.
2) For a “typical” message s1, X1 is unlikely to land in
Xη .
3) There is a vector w ∈ {0, 1}αn that cannot be extended
to a codeword (w,w′) that maps to either s0 or s1 by
the decoder.
We then use the above properties to design the following strat-
egy that violates non-malleability of the code: Given (X1, X2),
if X1 ∈ Xη , the adversary tampers the codeword to (w,X2),
which decodes to a message outside {s0, s1}. This ensures that
Dec(f(Enc(s0))) has a noticeable chance of being tampered
to an incorrect message. Otherwise, the adversary leaves
the codeword unchanged, ensuring that Dec(f(Enc(s1))) has
little chance of being tampered at all. Thus there is no
choice for a distribution Df that sufficiently matches both
Dec(f(Enc(s0))) and Dec(f(Enc(s1))).
Proof of Theorem 27: Throughout the proof, we use stan-
dard information theoretic tools, such as the notation H(X)
for the Shannon entropy of a discrete random variable X and
I(X;Y ) for the mutual information between discrete random
variables X and Y . We will need the following standard
information-theoretic fact.
Claim 29. Suppose H(X) 6 r and let p(x) := Pr[X = x].
For any η > 0, and define
Xη := {x ∈ supp(X) : p(x) > 1
2r/(1−η)
}.
Then, Pr[X ∈ Xη] > η and |X| < 2r/(1−η).
Proof. The upper bound on |Xη| is immediate from the
definition of Xη . Let X¯η := supp(X) \Xη . We need to show
that Pr[X ∈ X¯η] 6 1−η. If this is not the case, we can write
H(X) >
∑
x∈X¯η
p(x) log(1/p(x))
>
∑
x∈X¯η
rp(x)
1− η
= Pr[x ∈ X¯η]r/(1− η) > r,
a contradiction.
Suppose there is a coding scheme (Enc,Dec) that is non-
malleable for the family FT and achieving rate at least 1−α+
δ, for an arbitrarily small parameter δ ∈ (0, α]. Let S ∼ Uk,
X := Enc(S) and suppose X = (X1, X2) where X1 := XT
and X2 := XT¯ .
For any s ∈ {0, 1}k, define E(s) := supp(Enc(s)). Observe
that
ES |E(S)| 6 N/N1−α+δ = Nα−δ
By Markov’s bound, for any γ ∈ (0, 1],
Pr[|E(S)| > Nα−δ/γ] < γ. (23)
By the assumption on rate, H(S) > n(1 − α + δ). Also,
H(X2|S) 6 H(X2) 6 n− |T | = n(1− α). Thus,
I(X2;S) = H(S)−H(S | X2)
Using the chain rule for mutual information,
I(X1;S) = I(X1, X2;S)− I(X2;S | X1)
= (H(S)−H(S | X1, X2))
− (H(X2 | X1)−H(X2 | S,X1))
> H(S)−H(X2 | X1) (24)
> H(S)−H(X2) (25)
> (1− α+ δ)n− (1− α)n = δn, (26)
where (24) holds because S = Dec(X1, X2) and thus H(S |
X1, X2) = 0, in addition to non-negativity of entropy; (25)
uses the fact that conditioning does not increase entropy; and
(26) holds because of the assumption on the rate of the code
and the length of X2. From this, we can deduce that
H(X1 | S) = H(X1)− I(X1;S) 6 H(X1)− δn.
Note that the latter inequality in particular implies that
H(X1) > δn, and that supp(X1) > 2δn. By Markov’s bound,
|{s ∈ {0, 1}k : H(X1 | S = s) > (H(X1)− δn)(1 + 4γ)}|
<
2k
1 + 4γ
6 (1− 2γ)2k. (27)
By combining (23) and (27) using a union bound, there is a
choice of s0 ∈ {0, 1}k such that
|E(s0)| 6 Nα−δ/γ,
and,
H(X1 | S = s0) 6 (H(X1)− δn)(1 + 4γ).
We can take γ := δ/(8α) so that the above becomes
|E(s0)| 6 8αNα−δ/δ, (28)
and,
H(X1 | S = s0) 6 H(X1)− δn/2.
For a parameter η > 0, to be determined later, we can now
apply Claim 29 to the conditional distribution of X1 subject
to S = s0 and construct a set Xη ⊆ {0, 1}αn such that
Pr[X1 ∈ Xη | S = s0] > η, (29)
|Xη| 6 2(H(X1)−δn/2)/(1−η).
Let η′ := Pr[X1 ∈ Xη], and let h(·) denote the binary
entropy function. Using a simple information-theoretic rule
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that follows from the definition of Shannon entropy, we can
write
H(X1) = h(η
′) + η′H(X1 | X1 ∈ Xη)
+ (1− η′)H(X1 | X1 /∈ Xη)
6 h(η′) + η′ · H(X1)− (δ/2)n
1− η
+ (1− η′)H(X1 | X1 /∈ Xη) (30)
6 h(η′) + η′ · H(X1)− (δ/2)n
1− η
+ (1− η′)H(X1), (31)
where (30) is due to the upper bound on the support size of Xη
and (31) holds since conditioning does not increase entropy.
After simple manipulations, (31) simplifies to
η′ 6 2h(η
′)(1− η)
δn− 2ηH(X1) 6
2h(η′)
n(δ − 2ηα) . (32)
Now, we take η := δ/(4α), so that the above inequalities,
combined with the estimate h(η′) = O(η′ log(1/η′)) yields
h(η′)/η′ > δn/4⇒ log(1/η′) = Ω(δn)
⇒ η′ 6 exp(−Ω(δn)).
From the above inequality, straightforward calculations ensure
that
η′ 6 η/4 = δ/(16α), (33)
as long as δ > δ0 = O((log n)/n).
From (33), recalling that η′ = Pr[X1 ∈ Xη] and using
Markov’s bound,
|{s : Pr[X1 ∈ Xη | S = s] > η/2}|/2k < 1/2.
Combined with (23) and a union bound, there is a fixed s1 ∈
{0, 1}k such that
|E(s1)| 6 8αNα−δ/δ, and, Pr[X1 ∈ Xη | S = s1] 6 η/2.
(34)
Assuming the chosen lower bound for δ, we can also ensure
that, using (28), that |E(s0) ∪ E(s1)| < Nα. Thus, there is
a fixed string w ∈ {0, 1}αn that cannot be extended to any
codeword in E(s0) or in E(s1); i.e.,
Pr[X1 = w | (S = s0) ∨ (S = s1)] = 0,
which in turn implies
(∀x2 ∈ {0, 1}n(1−α)) : Dec(w, x2) /∈ {s0, s1}. (35)
Now, we consider the following tampering strategy
f : {0, 1}|T | × {0, 1}n−|T | → {0, 1}|T | × {0, 1}n−|T |
acting on the coordinate positions in T :
• Given (x1, x2) ∈ {0, 1}|T | × {0, 1}n−|T |, if x1 ∈ Xη ,
output (w, x2).
• Otherwise, output (x1, x2).
Suppose the coding scheme (Enc,Dec) satisfied Definition 4
for a particular distribution Df over {0, 1}n ∪ {same,⊥} for
the tampering function f .
Since f does not alter any string with the first component
outside Xη , (34) implies that
Pr[f(X1, X2) = (X1, X2) | S = s1] > 1− η/2. (36)
On the other hand, by (29) and (35),
Pr[Dec(f(X1, X2)) /∈ {s0, s1} | S = s0] > η. (37)
By (37) and Definition 4, Df must be -close to a distribution
D0 that assigns at most 1 − η of the probability mass to
{same, s0, s1}. On the other hand, by (36), Df must be -
close to a distribution D1 that assigns at least 1− η/2 of the
probability mass to {same, s1}. Thus, the statistical distance
between D0 and D1 is at least η/2 (from the distinguisher
corresponding to the event {same, s1}). By triangle inequality,
however, D0 and D1 are (2)-close. Therefore,  > η/4 and
the result follows.
D. The rate 1/2 barrier for the uniform coding scheme.
Dziembowski et al. [1] consider the uniformly random
coding scheme (Enc,Dec) in which the decoder Dec maps any
given input x ∈ {0, 1}n to a uniform and independent random
string in {0, 1}k. Moreover, the encoder, given s ∈ {0, 1}k,
outputs a uniformly random element of Dec−1(s). In this
section, we show that the uniform coding scheme cannot
achieve a rate better than 1/2 even with respect to very
simple tampering functions, namely, any tampering function
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n that is a bijection (for example, one
may think of f as the function that flips the first bit of the
input).
The high level intuition is quite simple: according to the
definition of non-malleability, for a uniformly random message
S ∈ {0, 1}k, the random variable Dec(f(Enc(S))) is “essen-
tially independent” of S (as made precise in Definition 4). On
the other hand, this random variable should have almost max-
imal entropy (i.e., k) since the decoder is a uniformly random
function. Thus the entropy of the tuple (S,Dec(f(Enc(S))))
should be close to 2k. On the other hand, this entropy is also
at most n since since (S,Dec(f(Enc(S)))) is a deterministic
function of Enc(S) which is an n-bit string. Therefore the rate
k/n cannot be much more than 1/2. The following theorem
makes this intuition rigorous.
Theorem 30. Let (Enc,Dec) be a coding scheme with mes-
sage length k and block length n that is randomly constructed
as follows. The decoder Dec is taken to be a random function
mapping each input x ∈ {0, 1}n to a uniform and indepen-
dent random string in {0, 1}k. Moreover, the encoder, given
s ∈ {0, 1}k, outputs a uniformly random element of Dec−1(s).
Let  denote the error of the C as a non-malleable coding
scheme against any family of adversaries containing some
bijective function. Then, with probability 1 − ok(1) over the
randomness of the code construction, the rate R of the code
must satisfy
R 6 1/2 +O() + ok(1).
Proof. Let C denote the randomized coding scheme defined
by the pair (Enc,Dec). Let Y ∼ Un be a uniform string and
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S := Dec(Y ). Note that S ∈ {0, 1}k. Consider an independent
random variable Y ′ ∼ Un and let S′ := Dec(Y ′). Over the
randomness of both C and (Y, Y ′), the two random variables S
and S′ are independent and uniformly distributed on {0, 1}k.
Therefore, we can write down the collision probability of S
and S′ as
Pr
C,Y,Y ′
[S = S′] = EC Pr
Y,Y ′
[S = S′] = 1/K,
where K := 2k. Using Markov’s bound, for a small parameter
δ > 0 to be determined later,
Pr
C
[ Pr
Y,Y ′
[S = S′] > (1/K)1−δ] 6 (1/K)δ.
Let c be a particular instantiation of C as determined by
the random coin tosses of the code construction. We use
D(S | C = c) to denote the distribution of S as defined by the
particular choice of c. So far we have shown that for at least
1 − (1/K)δ fraction of the choices of c, the code C is such
that
Pr
Y,Y ′
[S = S′ | C = c] < (1/K)1−δ,
and thus, the collision entropy8 of D(S | C = c) is at
least (1 − δ)k. Since the collision entropy lower bounds the
Shannon entropy, we see that there is a good chance (at least
1− (1/K)δ) that after fixing the code C, we have
H(S | C = c) > (1− δ)k. (38)
Consider any bijective tampering function f : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n. In particular this implies that f(Y ) 6= Y . Since
Dec(Y ) and Dec(f(Y )) are independent and uniform over
{0, 1}k (with respect to the randomness of C), we see that
Pr
C,Y
[Dec(Y ) = Dec(f(Y ))] = EC Pr
Y
[Dec(Y )
= Dec(f(Y ))] = 1/K.
Similar to the above, using Markov’s inequality we see that
for at least 1− (1/K)δ fraction of the choices of c, the code
C is such that
Pr
Y
[Dec(Y ) = Dec(f(Y )) | C = c] < (1/K)1−δ. (39)
In the sequel, we assume C to be such that both (38) and
(39) are satisfied (by a union bound, this is the case with
probability at least 1 − 2(1/K)δ over the randomness of the
code construction). Since the following discussion focuses
on this fixed outcome of the code C, in the sequel we find
it convenient to remove the conditioning C = c from the
notation.
Observe that Y has the same distribution as Enc(S) (accord-
ing to the way the encoder is defined), and in particular Enc(S)
is uniformly distributed on {0, 1}n (observe that although after
fixing the code, the distribution of S may become non-uniform
over {0, 1}k, the distribution of Enc(S) remains uniform over
8The collision entropy H2(X) (also known as Re´nyi entropy) is defined
as H2(X) = − log(Pr[X = X′]), where X′ is an independent copy of X .
It is a standard exercise to show that H2(X) 6 H(X).
{0, 1}n due to the way the encoder function is defined). Thus
we can rewrite (39) as
Pr[S = Dec(f(Enc(S)))] < (1/K)1−δ,
where the probability is over S and the internal coin tosses of
Enc. By averaging, there is some fixed s ∈ {0, 1}k such that
Pr[s = Dec(f(Enc(s)))] < (1/K)1−δ. (40)
Assume now that the coding scheme is non-malleable with
respect to any family containing f and error at most . Let Df
be the distribution over {0, 1}k∪{⊥, same} from Definition 4
and S′′ be a fresh sample from Df . Thus, non-malleability
implies that
D(Dec(f(Enc(s)))) ≈ D(copy(S′′, s)). (41)
In the above equation, the probability mass of s in the left
hand side distribution is at most (1/K)1−δ according to (40).
The corresponding mass in the right hand side distribution is,
however, Pr[S′′ ∈ {s, same}]. Therefore, the two distributions
being -close implies that
Df (same) < (1/K)1−δ + . (42)
Let D′f be any distribution over {0, 1}k ∪ {⊥} obtained from
Df by redistributing the probability mass of Df on same
arbitrarily to other points in the sample space, and let S0
be a fresh sample from D′f . Note that according to (42), the
distributions Df and D′f are ((1/K)1−δ + )-close. Using this
and (41) (which is valid for all s according to Definition 4),
we get that
D(S,Dec(f(Enc(S)))) ≈ D(copy(S′′, S))
≈′ D(S, copy(S0, S))
= D(S, S0), (43)
where ′ := (1/K)1−δ + 2 (note that since S0 is never equal
to same, we always have copy(S0, S) = S0). Observe that
(43) in particular implies that
D(Dec(f(Enc(S)))) ≈′ D(S0),
but since D(Enc(S)) = D(Y ) = Un, and f is a bijection, the
left hand side distribution is the same as D(S) = D(S′) and
thus, D(S′) ≈′ D(S0), and
D(S, S0) ≈′ D(S, S′),
where we recall that the random variable S′ is independent
from S with the same distribution. Plugging this back into
(43), we see using the triangle inequality that
D(S,Dec(f(Enc(S)))) ≈2′ D(S, S′). (44)
Using this result and (38), and recalling that S and S′ are
independent random variables (even conditioned on C) we
have that
H(S, S′) = 2H(S) > 2(1− δ)k. (45)
On the other hand, since the random variable
(S,Dec(f(Enc(S)))) is a deterministic function of Enc(S),
the latter being an n-bit string, we also have
H(S,Dec(f(Enc(S)))) 6 n. (46)
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We can now combine (44), (45) and (46) to conclude, using
Proposition 37, that with probability at least 1−2(1/K)δ over
the randomness of the code construction, the coding scheme
C must satisfy
2(1− δ)k 6 n(1 + ′) + 1 = n(1 +O((1/K)1−δ + )) + 1.
Assuming that δ 6 1/2 and + 2−k/2 6 1/2, we can slightly
simplify the above to get that the rate R of the code must
satisfy
R 6 (1−O(δ)) · (1/2 +O(+ 2−k/2)) + o(1).
As the message length k grows to infinity, we can pick δ to
be a sub-constant term, say δ = 1/
√
k to conclude that with
probability at least 1−21−δk = 1−ok(1) over the randomness
of the code construction, the coding scheme C must satisfy
R 6 1/2 +O() + ok(1)
as desired.
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APPENDIX
A. Useful tools concerning random variables
In many occasions in the paper, we deal with a chain of
correlated random variables 0 = X0, X1, . . . , Xn where we
wish to understand an event depending on Xi conditioned on
the knowledge of the previous variables. That is, we wish to
understand
E[f(Xi) | X0, . . . , Xi−1].
The following proposition shows that in order to understand
the above quantity, it suffices to have an estimate with
respect to a more restricted event than the knowledge of
X0, . . . , Xi−1. Formally, we can state the following, where
X stands for Xi in the above example and Y stands for
(X0, . . . , Xi−1).
Proposition 31. Let X and Y be possibly correlated random
variables and let Z be a random variable such that the
knowledge of Z determines Y ; that is, Y = f(Z) for some
function f . Suppose that for every possible outcome of the
random variable Z, namely, for every z ∈ supp(Z), and for
some real-valued function g, we have
E[g(X) | Z = z] ∈ I. (47)
for a particular interval I . Then, for every y ∈ supp(Y ),
E[g(X) | Y = y] ∈ I.
Similarly, suppose for some distribution D, and all z ∈
supp(Z),
D(X | Z = z) ≈ D.
Then, for all y ∈ supp(Y ),
D(X | Y = y) ≈ D.
Proof. Let T = {z ∈ supp(Z) : f(z) = y}, and let p(z) :=
Pr[Z = z | Y = y]. Then,
E[g(X) | Y = y] =
∑
z∈T
p(z)E[g(X) | Z = z].
Since by (47), each E[g(X) | Z = z] lies in I and∑
z∈T p(z) = 1, we deduce that
E[g(X) | Y = y] ∈ I.
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Proof of the second part is similar, by observing that if a
collection of distributions is statistically close to a particular
distribution D, any convex combination of them is equally
close to D as well.
Proposition 32. Let the random variable X ∈ {0, 1}n be
uniform on a set of size at least (1 − )2n. Then, D(X) is
(/(1− ))-close to Un.
We will use the following tail bounds on summation of
possibly dependent random variables, which are direct conse-
quences of Azuma’s inequality.
Proposition 33. Let 0 = X0, X1, . . . , Xn be possibly corre-
lated random variables in [0, 1] such that for every i ∈ [n]
and for some γ > 0,
E[Xi | X0, . . . , Xi−1] 6 γ.
Then, for every c > 1,
Pr[
n∑
i=1
Xi > cnγ] 6 exp(−nγ2(c− 1)2/2),
or equivalently, for every δ > γ,
Pr[
n∑
i=1
Xi > nδ] 6 exp(−n(δ − γ)2/2).
Proof. The proof is a standard Martingale argument. For i ∈
[n], define
X ′i := Xi − γ,
and
Si :=
i∑
j=1
X ′i =
i∑
j−1
Xi − iγ.
By assumption, Si is a super-martingale, that is, assuming
S0 := 0,
E[Si+1 | S0, . . . , Si] 6 Si.
Thus, by Azuma’s inequality, for all t > 0,
Pr[Sn > t] 6 exp(−t2/(2n)).
Substituting t := (c− 1)nγ proves the claim.
In a similar fashion (using Azuma’s inequality for sub-
martingales rather than super-martingales in the proof), we
may obtain a tail bound when we have a lower bound on
conditional expectations.
Proposition 34. Let 0 = X0, X1, . . . , Xn be possibly corre-
lated random variables in [0, 1] such that for every i ∈ [n]
and for some γ > 0,
E[Xi | X0, . . . , Xi−1] > γ.
Then, for every δ < γ,
Pr[
n∑
i=1
Xi 6 nδ] 6 exp(−n(δ − γ)2/2).
The following tail bound is similar in flavor to the one
given by Proposition 33, but only applies to indicator random
variables. However, it can be better when the individual
expectations are low and the target deviation from mean is
very large.
Proposition 35. Let 0 = X0, X1, . . . , Xn ∈ {0, 1} be
indicator, possibly dependent, random variables such that for
every i ∈ [n],
E[Xi | X1, . . . , Xi−1] 6 p,
for some p ∈ [0, 1]. Let X := X1 + · · ·+Xn. Then, for every
c > 1,
Pr[X > cnp] 6 (e/c)cnp.
Proof. We closely follow the standard proof of Chernoff
bounds for independent indicator random variables (see, e.g.,
[17]). Using Markov’s bound on the exponential moment of
X , we can write, for a parameter t > 0 to be determined later,
Pr[X > cnp] 6 E[exp(tX)]
exp(tcnp)
=
E[exp(tX1) · · · exp(tXn)]
exp(tcnp)
. (48)
However, we can write down the expectation of product as the
following chain of conditional expectations
E(X1,...,Xn)[exp(tX)] = EX1
[
etX1E(X2|X1)
[
etX2 . . .
E(Xn|X1,...,Xn−1)e
tXn ] . . .
]]
6 (p exp(t) + 1)n.
where the inequality uses the fact that the Xi are Bernoulli
random variables and thus
E[exp(tXi) | X1, . . . , Xi−1] 6 p exp(t) + (1− p) exp(0)
6 p exp(t) + 1.
Using the inequality (1 +x)n 6 exp(nx) the above simplifies
to
E[exp(tX)] 6 exp(np exp(t)),
and thus, plugging the above result into (48),
Pr[X > cnp] 6 exp(np exp(t))
exp(tcnp)
.
Choosing t := ln c yields the desired conclusion.
For summation of `-wise independent random variables, we
use the following tail bound from [18]:
Theorem 36. Let ` > 1 be an even integer, and let
X1, . . . , Xn ∈ [0, 1] be `-wise independent variables. Define
X := X1 + · · ·+Xn and µ := E[X]. Then,
Pr[|X − µ| > A] 6 8
(`(µ+ `)
A2
)`/2
.
We use the following standard result relating statistical
distance between distributions to the difference in Shannon
entropy.
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Proposition 37. Let X and Y be random variables over
{0, 1}n such that the statistical distance between the distri-
butions of X and Y is at most . Then, |H(X) − H(Y )| 6
n+ h(), where h(·) is the binary entropy function.
Proof. This is a standard result proved, for example, in [19]
((4) on page 3281) using coupling techniques. For complete-
ness, here we include a description due to Radhakrishnan9.
First, we suppose X and Y are coupled so that they maintain
their individual marginal distributions but Pr[X 6= Y ] 6 
(it is a standard fact that coupling in this fashion is always
possible for any two distributions over the same sample space).
Let Y = X + e where e ∈ {0, 1}n is the error vector and
addition is coordinate-wise XOR. Let Z ∈ {0, 1} denote the
error indicator; i.e., Z = 1 iff e 6= 0. Note that Pr[Z = 1] 6 ,
and thus
H(e | Z) = Pr[Z = 0] ·H(e | Z = 0)
+ Pr[Z = 1] ·H(e | Z = 1)
6 Pr[Z = 1] ·H(e) 6 n.
We have
H(X) = H(Y + e) 6 H(Y, e) 6 H(Y ) +H(e)
= H(Y ) +H(e, Z) 6 H(Y ) +H(Z) +H(e | Z)
6 H(Y ) + h() + n.
Since the above argument is symmetric with respect to X and
Y , we can also derive
H(Y ) 6 H(X) + h() + n
and the claim follows.
B. Approximating distributions by fuzzy correlated sampling
In this appendix, we show that it is possible to sharply
approximate a distribution D with finite support by sampling
possibly correlated random variables X1, . . . , Xn where the
distribution of each Xi is close to D conditioned on the
previous outcomes, and computing the empirical distribution
of the drawn samples.
Lemma 38. Let D be a distribution over a finite set Σ such
that |supp(D)| 6 r. For any η, , γ > 0 such that γ < , there
is a choice of
n = O((r + 2 + log(1/η))/(− γ)2)
such that the following holds. Suppose 0 = X0, X1, . . . , Xn ∈
Σ are possibly correlated random variables such that for all
i ∈ [n] and all values 0 = x0, x1 . . . , xn ∈ supp(D),
D(Xi | X0 = x0, . . . , Xi−1 = xi−1) ≈γ D.
Then, with probability at least 1−η, the empirical distribution
of the outcomes X1, . . . , Xn is -close to D.
9 Personal communication.
Proof. First, we argue that without loss of generality, we can
assume that |Σ| 6 r+ 1. This is because if not, we can define
a function f : Σ→ supp(D) ∪ {?} as follows:
f(x) :=
{
x if x ∈ supp(D)
? otherwise.
Observe that for any distribution D′ over Σ, dist(D′,D) =
dist(f(D′),D), since the elements outside supp(D) always
contribute to the statistical distance and we aggregate all such
mass on a single extra point ?, and by doing so do not
affect the statistical distance. Thus the empirical distribution
of (X1, . . . , Xn) is -close to D iff the empirical distribution
of (f(X1), . . . , f(Xn)) is.
Now suppose |Σ| 6 r + 1. Let A ⊆ Σ be any non-empty
event, and denote by D′ the empirical distribution of the
outcomes X1, . . . , Xn. Let p := D(A), and define indicator
random variables
Yi :=
{
0 Xi /∈ A,
1 Xi ∈ A.
for i ∈ [n] and Y0 := 0. Observe that
D′(A) =
∑n
i=1 Yi
n
,
and, by the assumption on the closeness of conditional distri-
butions of the Xi to D,
E[Yi | Y0, . . . , Yi−1] ∈ [p− γ, p+ γ].
By Propositions 33 and 34, we can thus obtain a concentration
bound
Pr[|D′(A)− p |> ] 6 2 exp(−(− γ)2n/2).
Now we can apply a union bound on all possible choices of
A and conclude that
Pr[¬(D′ ≈ D)] 6 2r+2 exp(−(− γ)2n/2),
which can be ensured to be at most η for some choice of
n = O((r + 2 + log(1/η))/(− γ)2).
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